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Abstract
We all are fascinated by the phenomena of intelligent behavior, as gen-
erated both by our own brains and by the brains of other animals. As
physicists we would like to understand if there are some general principles
that govern the structure and dynamics of the neural circuits that un-
derlie these phenomena. At the molecular level there is an extraordinary
universality, but these mechanisms are surprisingly complex. This raises
the question of how the brain selects from these diverse mechanisms and
adapts to compute “the right thing” in each context. One approach is to
ask what problems the brain really solves. There are several examples—
from the ability of the visual system to count photons on a dark night to
our gestalt recognition of statistical tendencies toward symmetry in ran-
dom patterns—where the performance of the system in fact approaches
some fundamental physical or statistical limits. This suggests that some
sort of optimization principles may be at work, and there are examples
where these principles have been formulated clearly and generated predic-
tions which are confirmed in new experiments; a central theme in this work
is the matching of the coding and computational strategies of the brain
to the statistical structure of the world around us. Extension of these
principles to the problem of learning leads us into interesting theoretical
questions about how to measure the complexity of the data from which
we learn and the complexity of the models that we use in learning, as well
as opening some new opportunities for experiment. This combination of
theoretical and experimental work gives us some new (if still speculative)
perspectives on classical problems and controversies in cognition.
∗To be published in Physics of Biomolecules and Cells, H. Flyvbjerg, F. Ju¨licher, P. Ormos,
& F. David, eds. (EDP Sciences, Les Ulis; Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2002).
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1 Introduction
Here in Les Houches we are surrounded by many beautiful and dramatic phe-
nomena of nature. In the last century we have come to understand the pow-
erful physical forces that shaped the landscape, creating the peaks that reach
thousands of meters into the sky. As we stand and appreciate the view, other
powerful forces also are at work: we are conscious of our surroundings, we parse
a rich scene into natural and manmade objects that have meaningful relation-
ships to one another and to us, and we learn about our environment so that
we can navigate even in the dark after long hours of discussion in the bar.
These aspects of intelligent behavior—awareness, perception, learning—surely
are among the most dramatic natural phenomena that we experience directly.
As physicists our efforts to provide a predictive, mathematical description of
nature are animated by the belief that qualitatively striking phenomena should
have deep theoretical explanations. The challenge, then, is to tame the evident
complexities of intelligent behavior and to uncover these deep principles.
Words such as “intelligent” perhaps are best viewed as colloquial rather
than technical: intelligent behavior refers to a class of phenomena exhibited
by humans and by many other organisms, and membership in this class is by
agreement among the participants in the conversation. There also is a technical
meaning of “intelligence,” determined by the people who construct intelligence
tests. This is an area fraught with political and sociological difficulties, and there
also is some force to Barlow’s criticism that intelligence tends to be defined as
what the tests measure [1]. For now let us leave the general term “intelligence”
as an informal one, and try to be precise about some particular aspects of
intelligent behavior.
Our first task, then, is to choose some subset of intelligent behaviors which we
can describe in quantitative terms. I shall have nothing to say about conscious-
ness, but for learning and perception we can go some way toward constructing
a theoretical framework within which quantitative experiments can be designed
and analyzed. Indeed, because perception constitutes our personal experience of
the physical world, there is a tradition of physicists being interested in percep-
tual phenomena that reaches back (at least) to Helmholtz, Rayleigh, Maxwell
and Ohm, and a correspondingly rich body of quantitative experimental work.
If we can give a quantitative description of the phenomena it is natural to hope
that some regularities may emerge, and that these could form the basis of a real
theory.
I will argue that there is indeed one very striking regularity that emerges
when we look quantitatively at the phenomena of perception, and this is a
notion of optimal performance. There are well defined limits to the reliability
of our perceptions set by noise at the sensory input, and this noise in turn
often has fundamental physical origins. In several cases the brain approaches
these limits to reliability, suggesting that the circuitry inside the brain is doing
something like an optimal processing of the inputs or an optimal extraction of
the information relevant for its tasks. It would be very attractive if this notion
of optimization—which grows out of the data!—could be elevated to a principle,
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and I will go through one example in detail where we have tried to carry out
this program.
The difficulty with collecting evidence for optimization is that we might be
left only with a list of unrelated examples: There is a set of tasks for which
performance is near optimal, and for each task we have a theory of how the
brain does the task based on optimization principles. But precisely because
the brain is not a general purpose computer, some tasks are done better than
others. What we would like is not a list, but some principled view of what the
brain does well. Almost since Shannon’s original papers there has been some
hope that information theory could provide such organizing principles, although
much of the history is meandering rather than conclusive. I believe that in the
past several years there has been substantial progress toward realizing the old
dreams. On the one hand we now have direct experimental demonstrations
that the nervous system can adapt to the statistical structure of the sensory
world in ways that serve to optimize the efficiency of information transmission
or representation. On the other hand, we have a new appreciation of how
information theory can be used to assess the relevance of sensory information
and the complexity of data streams. These theoretical developments unify ideas
that have arisen in fields as diverse as coding theory, statistics and dynamical
systems ... and hold out some hope for a unified view of many different tasks in
neural computation. I am very excited by all of this, and I hope to communicate
the reasons for my excitement.
A very different direction is to ask about the microscopic basis for the es-
sentially macroscopic phenomena of perception and learning. In the last decade
we have seen an explosion in the experimental tools for identifying molecular
components of biological systems, and as these tools have been applied to the
brain this has created a whole new field of molecular neurobiology. Indeed, the
volume of data on the molecular “parts list” of the brain is so vast that we
have to ask carefully what it is we would like to know, or more generally why
we are asking for a microscopic description. One possibility is that there is no
viable theory at a macroscopic level: if we want to know why we perceive the
world as we do, the answer might be found only in a detailed and exhaustive
investigation of what all the molecules and cells are doing in the relevant regions
of the brain. This is too horrible to discuss.
One very good reason for looking at the microscopic basis of neural com-
putation is that molecular events in the cells of the brain (neurons) provide
prototypes for thinking about molecular events in all cells, but with the advan-
tage that important parts of the function of neurons involve electrical signals
which are wonderfully accessible to quantitative measurements. Fifty years of
work has brought us a nearly complete list of molecular components involved in
the dynamics of neural signalling and computation, quantitative experiments on
the properties of these individual molecules, and accurate mathematical models
of how these individual molecular properties combine to determine the dynam-
ics of the cell as a whole. The result is that the best characterized networks
of molecular interactions in cells are the dynamics of ion channels in neurons.
This firm foundation puts us in a position to ask questions about the emergent
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properties of these networks, their stability and robustness, the role of noise,
... all in experimentally accessible systems where we really know the relevant
equations of motion and even most of the relevant parameters.
A very different reason for being interested in the molecular basis of per-
ception and learning is because, as it turns out, the brain is a very peculiar
computational device. As in all of biology, there is no obvious blueprint or
wiring diagram; everything organizes itself. More profoundly, perhaps, all the
components are impermanent. Particularly when we think about storing what
we have learned or hope to remember, the whole point seems to be a search
for permanence, yet almost every component of the relevant hardware in the
brain will be replaced on a time scale of weeks, roughly the duration of this
lecture series. Nonetheless we expect you to remember the events here in Les
Houches for a time much longer than the duration of the school. Not only is
there a problem of understanding how one stores information in such a dynamic
system, there is the problem of understanding how such a system maintains
stable function over long periods of time. Thus if the computations carried
out by a neuron are determined by the particular combination of ion channel
proteins that the cell expresses and inserts in the membrane, how does the cell
“know” and maintain the correct expression levels as proteins are constantly
replaced? Typical neurons express of order ten different kinds of ion channels
at once, and it is not clear what functions are made possible by this molecular
complexity—what can we do with ten types of channel that we can’t do with
nine? Finally, as in many aspects of life, crucial aspects of neural computation
are carried out by surprisingly small numbers of molecules, and we shall have to
ask how the system achieves reliability in the presence of the noise associated
with these small numbers.
The plan is to start by examining the evidence for optimal performance in
several systems, and then to explore information theoretic ideas that might pro-
vide some more unified view. Roughly speaking we will proceed from things
that are very much grounded in data—which is important, because we have
to convince ourselves that working on brains can involve experiments with the
“look and feel” of good physics—toward more abstract problems. I would hope
that some of the abstract ideas will link back to experiment, but I am still
unclear about how to do this. Near the end of the course I will circle back to
outline some of the issues in understanding the microscopic basis of neural com-
putation, and conclude with some speculative thoughts on the “hard problems”
of understanding cognition.
Some general references on the optimality of sensory and neural systems are
reviews which Barlow [2] and I [3, 4] have written, as well as sections of the
book Spikes [5], which may provide a useful reference for a variety of issues in
the lectures. Let me warn the reader that the level of detail, both in the text
and in the references, is a bit uneven (as were the lectures, I suspect). I have,
however, taken the liberty of scattering some problems throughout the text.
One last caveat: I am almost pathologically un–visual in my thinking, and so
I wrote this text without figures. I think it can work, in that the essential
ideas are summarizable in words and equations, but you really should look at
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original papers to see the data that support the theoretical claims and (more
importantly) to get a feeling for how the experiments really were done.
2 Photon counting
Sitting quietly in a dark room, we can detect the arrival of individual photons at
our retina. This observation has a beautiful history, with its roots in a suggestion
by Lorentz in 1911.1 Tracing through the steps from photon arrival to perception
we see a sampling of the physics problems posed by biological systems, ranging
from the dynamics of single molecules through amplification and adaptation in
biochemical reaction networks, coding and computation in neural networks, all
the way “up” to learning and cognition. For photon counting some of these
problems are solved, but even in this well studied case many problems are open
and ripe for new theoretical and experimental work. I will try to use the photon
counting example as a way of motivating some more general questions.
Prior to Lorentz’ suggestion, there was a long history of measuring the energy
of a light flash that just barely can be seen. There is, perhaps surprisingly, a
serious problem in relating this minimum energy of a visible flash to the number
of photons at the retina, largely because of uncertainties about scattering and
absorption in the eye itself. The compelling alternative is a statistical argument,
as first exploited by Hecht, Shlaer and Pirenne (in New York) and van der Velden
(in the Netherlands) in the early 1940s [8, 9]:
• The mean number of photons 〈n〉 at the retina is proportional to the
intensity I of the flash.
• With conventional light sources the actual number n of photons that arrive
from any single flash will obey Poisson statistics,
P (n|〈n〉) = exp(−〈n〉) 〈n〉
n
n!
(1)
• Suppose that we can see when at least K photons arrive. Then the prob-
ability of seeing is
Psee =
∑
n≥K
P (n|〈n〉). (2)
• We can ask an observer whether he or she sees the flash, and the first
nontrivial observation is that seeing really is probabilistic for dim flashes,
although this could just be fluctuations in attention.
• The key point is that however we measure the intensity I, we have 〈n〉 =
αI, with α some unknown proportionality constant, so that
Psee(I) =
∑
n≥K
P (n|〈n〉 = αI). (3)
1Reviews on photon counting and closely related issues include Refs. [2, 3, 7] and Chapter
4 of Ref. [5].
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If we plot Psee vs. log I, then one can see that the shape of the curve
depends crucially on the threshold photon count K, but changing the
unknown constant α just translates the curve along the x-axis. So we
have a chance to measure the threshold K without knowing α (which is
hard to measure).
Hecht, Shlaer and Pirenne did exactly this and found a beautiful fit to K =
5 or K = 7; subjects with different age had very different values for α but
similar values of K. This sounds good: maybe the probabilistic nature of our
perceptions just reflects the physics of random photon arrivals.
Problem 1: Poisson processes.2 To understand what is going on here it would
be a good idea if you review some facts about Poisson processes. By a ‘process’ we
mean in this case the time series of discrete events corresponding to photon arrivals
or absorption. If the typical time between events is long compared to any intrinsic
correlation times in the light source, it is plausible that each photon arrival will be
independent of the others, and this is the definition of a Poisson process.3 Thus, if we
look at a very small time interval dt, the probability of counting one event will be rdt,
where r is the mean counting rate. If we count in a time window of size T , the mean
count clearly will be 〈n〉 = rT .
a. Derive the probability density for events at times t1, t2, · · · , tn; remember to
include terms for the probability of not observing events at other times. Also,
the events are indistinguishable, so you need to include a combinatorial factor.
The usual derivation starts by taking discrete time bins of size dt, and then at
the end of the calculation you let dt→ 0. You should find that
P (t1, t2, · · · , tn) =
1
n!
rn exp(−rT ). (4)
Note that this corresponds to an ‘ideal gas’ of indistinguishable events.
b. Integrate over all the times t1, t2, · · · , tn in the window t ∈ [0, T ] to find the
probability of observing n counts. This should agree with Eq. (1), and you
should verify the normalization. What is the relation between the mean and
variance of this distribution?
An important point is that the 5 to 7 photons are distributed across a broad
area on the retina, so that the probability of one receptor (rod) cell getting
more than one photon is very small. Thus the experiments on human behavior
suggest that individual photoreceptor cells generate reliable responses to single
photons. This is a lovely example of using macroscopic experiments to draw
conclusions about single cells.
It took many years before anyone could measure directly the responses of
photoreceptors to single photons. It was done first in the (invertebrate) horse-
shoe crab, and eventually by Baylor and coworkers in toads [10] and then in
2Many of you have seen this before, so this is just a refresher. For the rest, you might
look at Appendices 4 and 5 in Spikes which give a fairly detailed step–by–step discussion of
Poisson processes [5].
3There is also the interesting fact that certain light sources will generate Poisson photon
counting distributions no matter how frequently the photons arrive: recall that for a har-
monic oscillator in a coherent state (as for the field oscillations in an ideal single mode laser),
measurements of the number of quanta yield a Poisson distribution, exactly.
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monkeys [11]. The complication in the lower vertebrate systems is that the cells
are coupled together, so that the retina can do something like adjusting the size
of pixels as a function of light intensity. This means that the nice big current
generated by one cell is spread as a small voltage in many cells, so the usual
method of measuring the voltage across the membrane of one cell won’t work;
you have to suck the cell into a pipette and collect the current, which is what
Baylor et al. managed to do. Single photon responses observed in this way are
about a picoamp in amplitude vs. a continuous background noise of 0.1 pA rms,
so these are easily detected.
A slight problem is that van der Velden found K = 2, far from the K = 5−7
found by Hecht, Shlaer and Pirenne. Barlow explained this discrepancy by
noting that even when counting single photons we may have to discriminate
(as in photomultipliers) against a background of dark noise [12]. Hecht, Shlaer
and Pirenne inserted blanks in their experiments to be sure that you never say
“I saw it” when nothing is there [that is, Psee(I = 0) = 0], which means you
have to set a high threshold to discriminate against the noise. On the other
hand, van der Velden was willing to allow for some false positive responses,
so his subjects could afford to set a lower threshold. Qualitatively this makes
sense, but to be a quantitative explanation the noise has to be at the right level.
Barlow reasoned that one source of noise was if the pigment molecule rhodopsin
spontaneously (as a result of thermal fluctuations) makes the transitions that
normally are triggered by a photon; of course these random events would be
indistinguishable from photon arrivals. He found that everything works if this
spontaneous event rate is equivalent to roughly 1 event per 1000 years per
molecule: there are a billion molecules in one rod cell, which gets us to one
event per minute per cell (roughly) and when we integrate over hundreds of
cells for hundreds of milliseconds we find a mean event count of ∼ 10, which
means that to be sure we see something we will have to count many more than√
10 extra events, corresponding to what Hecht, Shlaer and Pirenne found in
their highly reliable observers.
One of the key points here is that Barlow’s explanation only works if people
actually can adjust the “threshold” K in response to different situations. The
realization that this is possible was part of the more general recognition that
detecting a sensory signal does not involve a true threshold between (for exam-
ple) seeing and not seeing [13]. Instead we should imagine that—as when we
try to measure something in a physics experiment—all sensory tasks involve a
discrimination between signal and noise, and hence there are different strategies
which provide different ways of trading off among the different kinds of errors.
Suppose, for example, that you get to observe x which could be drawn either
from the probability distribution P+(x) or from the distribution P−(x); your
job is to tell me whether it was + or −. Note that the distribution could be
controlled completely by the experimenter (if you play loud but random noise
sounds, for example) or the distribution could be a model of noise generated in
the receptor elements or even deep in the brain. At least for simple forms of the
distributions P±(x), we can make a decision about how to assign a particular
value of x by simply setting a threshold θ; if x > θ we say that x came from the
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+ distribution, and conversely. How should we set θ? Let’s try to maximize the
probability that we get the right answer. If x is chosen from + with probability
P (+), and similarly for −, then the probability that our threshold rule gets the
correct answer is
Pcorrect(θ) = P (+)
∫ ∞
θ
dxP+(x) + P (−)
∫ θ
−∞
dxP−(x). (5)
To maximize Pcorrect(θ) we differentiate with respect to θ and set this equal to
zero:
dPcorrect(θ)
dθ
= 0 (6)
⇒ P (+)P+(θ) = P (−)P−(θ). (7)
In particular if P (+) = P (−) = 1/2, we set the threshold at the point where
P+(θ) = P−(θ); another way of saying this is that we assign each x to the
probability distribution that has the larger density at x—“maximum likelihood.”
Notice that if the probabilities of the different signals + and − change, then the
optimal setting of the threshold changes.
Problem 2: More careful discrimination. Assume as before that x is chosen
either from P+(x) or from P−(x). Rather than just setting a threshold, consider the
possibility that when you see x you assign it to the + distribution with a probability
f(x).
a. Express the probability of a correct answer in terms of f(x), generalizing Eq.
(5); this is a functional Pcorrect[f(x)].
b. Solve the optimization problem for the function f(x); that is, solve the equation
δPcorrect[f(x)]
δf(x)
= 0. (8)
Show that the solution is deterministic [f(x) = 1 or f(x) = 0], so that if the
goal is to be correct as often as possible you shouldn’t hesitate to make a crisp
assignment even at values of x where you aren’t sure (!).
c. Consider the case where P±(x) are Gaussian distributions with the same variance
but different means. Evaluate the minimum error probability (formally) and give
asymptotic results for large and small differences in mean. How large do we need
to make this ‘signal’ to be guaranteed only 1% errors?
d. Generalize these results to multidimensional Gaussian distributions, and give
a geometrical picture of the assignment rule. This problem is easiest if the
different Gaussian variables are independent and have equal variances. What
happens in the more general case of arbitrary covariance matrices?
There are classic experiments to show that people will adjust their thresh-
olds automatically when we change the a priori probabilities, as expected for
optimal performance. This can be done without any explicit instructions—you
don’t have to tell someone that you are changing the value of P (+). At least
implicitly, then, people learn something about probabilities and adjust their
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assignment criteria appropriately. As we will discuss later in the course, there
are other ways of showing that people (and other animals) can learn something
about probabilities and use this knowledge to change their behavior in sensible
ways. Threshold adjustments also can be driven by changing the rewards for
correct answers or the penalties for wrong answers. In this view, it is likely that
Hecht et al. drove their observers to high thresholds by having a large effective
penalty for false positive detections. Although it’s not a huge literature, people
have since manipulated these penalties and rewards in HSP–style experiments,
with the expected results. Perhaps more dramatically, modern quantum optics
techniques have been used to manipulate the statistics of photon arrivals at the
retina, so that the tradeoffs among the different kinds of errors are changed ...
again with the expected results [14].
Not only did Baylor and coworkers detect the single photon responses from
toad photoreceptor cells, they also found that single receptor cells in the dark
show spontaneous photon–like events at just the right rate to be the source
of dark noise identified by Barlow [15]! Just to be clear, Barlow identified a
maximum dark noise level; anything higher and the observed reliable detection
is impossible. The fact that the real rod cells have essentially this level of dark
noise means that the visual system is operating near the limits of reliability set
by thermal noise in the input. It would be nice, however, to make a more direct
test of this idea.
In the lab we often lower the noise level of photodetectors by cooling them.
This isn’t so easy in humans, but it does work with cold blooded animals like
frogs and toads. So, Aho et al. [16] convinced toads to strike with their tongues
at small worm–like objects illuminated by dim flashes of light, and measured
how the threshold for reliable striking varied with temperature. It’s important
that the prediction is for more reliable behavior as you cool down—all the way
down to the temperature where behavior stops—and this is what Aho et al.
observed. Happily, Baylor et al. also measured the temperature dependence of
the noise in the detector cells. The match of behavioral and cellular noise levels
vs. temperature is perfect, strong evidence that visual processing in dim lights
really is limited by input noise and not by any inefficiencies of the brain.
Problem 3: Should you absorb all the photons? Consider a rod photoreceptor
cell of length ℓ, with concentration C of rhodopsin; let the absorption cross section
of rhodopsin be σ. The probability that a single photon incident on the rod will be
counted is then p = 1− exp(−Cσℓ), suggesting that we should make C or ℓ larger in
order to capture more of the photons. On the other hand, as we increase the number
of Rhodopsin molecules (CAℓ, with A the area of the cell) we also increase the rate of
dark noise events. Show that the signal–to–noise ratio for detecting a small number
of incident photons is maximized at a nontrivial value of C or ℓ, and calculate the
capture probability p at this optimum. Do you find it strange that the best thing to
do is to let some of the photons go by without counting them? Can you see any way
to design an eye which gets around this argument? Hint: Think about what you see
looking into a cat’s eyes at night.
These observations on the ability of the visual system to count single photons—
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down to the limit set by thermal noise in rhodopsin itself—raise questions at
several different levels:
• At the level of single molecules, there are many interesting physics prob-
lems in the dynamics of rhodopsin itself.
• At the level of single cells, there are challenges in understanding how a
network of biochemical reactions converts individual molecular events into
macroscopic electrical currents across the rod cell membrane.
• At the level of the retina as a whole, we would like to understand the rules
whereby these signals are encoded into the stereotyped pulses which are
the universal language of the brain.
• At the level of the whole organism, there are issues about how the brain
learns to make the discriminations which are required for optimal perfor-
mance.
Let’s look at these questions in order. The goal here is more to provide pointers
to interesting and exemplary issues than to provide answers.
At the level of single molecule dynamics, our ability to see in the dark ulti-
mately is limited by the properties of rhodopsin (because everything else works
so well!). Rhodopsin consists of a medium–sized organic pigment, retinal, en-
veloped by a large protein, opsin; the photo–induced reaction is isomerization of
the retinal, which ultimately couples to structural changes in the protein. One
obvious function of the protein is to tune the absorption spectrum of retinal so
that the same organic pigment can work at the core of the molecules in rods
and in all three different cones, providing the basis for color vision. Retinal
has a spontaneous isomerization rate of ∼ 1/yr, 1000 times that of rhodopsin,
so clearly the protein acts to lower the dark noise level. This is not so diffi-
cult to understand, since one can imagine how a big protein literally could get
in the way of the smaller molecule’s motion and raise the barrier for thermal
isomerization. Although this sounds plausible, it’s probably wrong: the activa-
tion energies for thermal isomerization in retinal and in rhodopsin are almost
the same. Thus one either must believe that the difference is in an entropic
contribution to the barrier height or in dynamical terms which determine the
prefactor of the transition rate. I don’t think the correct answer is known.
On the other hand, the photo–induced isomerization rate of retinal is only
∼ 109 s−1, which is slow enough that fluorescence competes with the struc-
tural change.4 Now fluorescence is a disaster for visual pigment—not only don’t
you get to count the photon where it was absorbed, but it might get counted
somewhere else, blurring the image. In fact rhodopsin does not fluoresce: the
quantum yield or branching ratio for fluorescence is ∼ 10−5, which means that
the molecule is changing its structure and escaping the immediate excited state
4Recall from quantum mechanics that the spontaneous emission rates from electronic ex-
cited states are constrained by sum rules if they are dipole–allowed. This means that emission
lifetimes for visible photons are order 1 nanosecond for almost all of the simple cases ... .
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in tens of femtoseconds [17]. Indeed, for years every time people built faster
pulsed lasers, they went back to rhodopsin to look at the initial events, culmi-
nating in the direct demonstration of femtosecond isomerization [18], making
this one of the fastest molecular events ever observed.
The combination of faster photon induced isomerization and slower thermal
isomerization means that the protein opsin acts as an electronic state selective
catalyst: ground state reactions are inhibited, excited state reactions acceler-
ated, each by orders of magnitude. It is fair to say that if these state dependent
changes in reaction rate did not occur (that is, if the properties of rhodopsin
were those of retinal) we simply could not see in the dark.
Our usual picture of molecules and their transitions comes from chemical
kinetics: there are reaction rates, which represent the probability per unit time
for the molecule to make transitions among states which are distinguishable by
some large scale rearrangement; these transitions are cleanly separated from the
time scales for molecules to come to equilibrium in each state, so we describe
chemical reactions (especially in condensed phases) as depending on tempera-
ture not on energy. The initial isomerization event in rhodopsin is so fast that
this approximation certainly breaks down. More profoundly, the time scale of
the isomerization is so fast that it competes with the processes that destroy
quantum mechanical coherence among the relevant electronic and vibrational
states [19]. The whole notion of an irreversible transition from one state to an-
other necessitates the loss of coherence between these states (recall Schro¨dinger’s
cat), and so in this sense the isomerization is proceeding as rapidly as possi-
ble. I don’t think we really understand, even qualitatively, the physics here.5 If
rhodopsin were the only example of this ‘almost coherent chemistry’ that would
be good enough, but in fact the other large class of photon induced events in
biological systems—photosynthesis—also proceed so rapidly as to compete with
loss of coherence, and the crucial events again seem to happen (if you pardon
the partisanship) while everything is still in the domain of physics and not con-
ventional chemistry [23, 24]. Why biology pushes to these extremes is a good
question. How it manages to do all this with big floppy molecules in water at
roughly room temperature also is a great question.
At the level of single cells, the biochemical circuitry of the rod takes one
molecule of activated rhodopsin and turns this into a macroscopic response.
5That’s not to say people aren’t trying; the theoretical literature also is huge, with much
of it (understandably) focused on how the protein influences the absorption spectra of the
chromophore. The dynamical problems are less well studied, although again there is a fairly
large pile of relevant papers in the quantum chemistry literature (which I personally find very
difficult to read). In the late 1970 and early 1980s, physicists got interested in the electronic
properties of conjugated polymers because of the work by Heeger and others showing that
these quasi–1D materials could be doped to make good conductors. Many people must have
realized that the dynamical models being used by condensed matter physicists for (ideally)
infinite chains might also have something to say about finite chains, but again this was largely
the domain of chemists who had a rather different point of view. Kivelson and I tried to see
if we could make the bridge from the physicists’ models to the dynamics of rhodopsin, which
was very ambitious and never quite finished; there remains a rather inaccessible conference
proceeding outlining some of the ideas [20]. Our point of view was rediscovered and developed
by Aalberts and coworkers a decade later [21, 22].
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Briefly, the activated rhodopsin is a catalyst that activates many other molecules,
which in turn act as catalysts and so on. Finally there is a catalyst (enzyme)
that eats cyclic GMP, but cGMP binds to and opens ionic channels in the cell
membrane. So when the cGMP concentration falls, channels close, and the elec-
trical current flowing into the cell is reduced.6 The gain of this system must
be large—many molecules of cGMP are broken down for each single activated
rhodopsin—but gain isn’t the whole story. First, most models for such a chem-
ical cascade would predict large fluctuations in the number of molecules at the
output since the lifetime of the active state of the single active rhodopsin fluctu-
ates wildly (again, in the simplest models) [7, 26]. Second, as the lights gradually
turn on one has to regulate the gain, or else the cell will be overwhelmed by the
accumulation of a large constant signal; in fact, eventually all the channels close
and the cell can’t respond at all. Third, since various intermediate chemicals
are present in finite concentration, there is a problem of making sure that sig-
nals rise above the fluctuations in these concentrations—presumably while not
expending to much energy too make vast excesses of anything. To achieve the re-
quired combination of gain, reliability, and adaptation almost certainly requires
a network with feedback. The quantitative and even qualitative properties of
such networks depend on the concentration of various protein components, yet
the cell probably cannot rely on precise settings for these concentrations, so this
robustness creates yet another problem.7
Again if photon counting were the only example all of this it might be inter-
esting enough, but in fact there are many cells which build single molecule
detectors of this sort, facing all the same problems. The different systems
use molecular components that are sufficiently similar that one can recognize
the homologies at the level of the DNA sequences which code for the relevant
proteins—so much so, in fact, that one can go searching for unknown molecules
by seeking out these homologies. This rough universality of tasks and com-
ponents cries out for a more principled view of how such networks work (see,
for example, Ref. [27]); photon counting is such an attractive example because
there is an easily measurable electrical output and because there are many tricks
for manipulating the network components (see, for example, Ref. [28]).
At the level of the retina as a whole, the output which gets transmitted to
the brain is not a continuous voltage or current indicating (for example) the
light intensity or photon counting rate; instead signals are encoded as sequences
of discrete identical pulses called action potentials or spikes. Signals from the
photodetector cells are sent from the eye to the brain (after some interesting
processing within the retina itself ... ) along ∼ 106 cables—nerve cell ‘axons’—
that form the optic nerve. Roughly the same number of cables carry signals
from the sensors in our skin, for example, while each ear sends ∼ 40, 000 axons
into the central nervous system. It is very likely that our vision in the photon
counting regime is triggered by the occurrence of just a few extra spikes along
6Actually we can go back to the level of single molecules and ask questions about the
‘design’ of these rather special channels ... .
7If the cell does regulate molecule counts very accurately, one problem could be solved,
but then you have to explain the mechanism of regulation.
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at most a few optic nerve axons [5, 29]. For the touch receptors in our fingertips
there is direct evidence that our perceptions can be correlated with the presence
or absence of a single action potential along one out of the million input cables
[30]. To go beyond simple detection we have to understand how the complex,
dynamic signals of the sensory world can be represented in these seemingly
sparse pulse trains [5].
Finally, the problem of photon counting—or any simple detection task—
hides a deeper question: how does the brain “know” what it needs to do in any
given task? Even in our simple example of setting a threshold to maximize the
probability of a correct answer, the optimal observer must at least implicitly
acquire knowledge of the relevant probability distributions. Along these lines,
there is more to the ‘toad cooling’ experiment than a test of photon counting
and dark noise. The retina has adaptive mechanisms that allow the response to
speed up at higher levels of background light, in effect integrating for shorter
times when we can be sure that the signal to noise ratio will be high. The flip
side of this mechanism is that the retinal response slows down dramatically in
the dark. In moderate darkness (dusk or bright moonlight) Aho et al. found
that the slowing of the retinal response is reflected directly in a slowing of
the animal’s behavior [25]: it is as if the toad experiences an illusion because
images of its target are delayed, and it strikes at the delayed image.8 But if this
continued down to the light levels in the darkest night, it would be a disaster,
since the delay would mean that the toad inevitably strikes behind the target!
In fact, the toad does not strike at all in the first few trials of the experiment
in dim light, and then strikes well within the target. It is hard to escape the
conclusion that the animal is learning about the typical velocity of the target
and then using this knowledge to extrapolate and thereby correct for retinal
delays.9 Thus, performance in the limit where we count photons involves not
only efficient processing of these small signals but also learning as much as
possible about the world so that these small signals become interpretable.
We take for granted that life operates within boundaries set by physics—
there are no vital forces.10 What is striking about the example of photon count-
8We see this illusion too. Watch a pendulum swinging while wearing glasses that have a
neutral density filter over one eye, so the mean light intensity in the two eyes is different. The
dimmer light results in a slower retina, so the signals from the two eyes are not synchronous.
As we try to interpret these signals in terms of motion, we find that even if the pendulum is
swinging in a plane parallel to the line between our eyes, what we see is motion in 3D. The
magnitude of the apparent depth of oscillation is related to the neutral density and hence to
the slowing of signals in the ‘darker’ retina.
9As far as I know there are no further experiments that probe this learning more directly,
e.g. by having the target move at variable velocities.
10Casual acceptance of this statement of course reflects a hard fought battle that stretched
from debates about conservation of energy in ∼1850 to the discovery of the DNA structure in
∼1950. If you listen carefully, some people who talk about the mysteries of the brain and mind
still come dangerously close to a vitalist position, and the fact that we can’t really explain
how such complex structures evolved leaves room for wriggling, some of which makes it into
the popular press. Note also that, as late as 1965, Watson was compelled to have a section
heading in Molecular Biology of the Gene which reads “Cells obey the laws of physics and
chemistry.” Interestingly, this continues to appear in later editions.
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ing is that in this case life operates at the limit: you can’t count half a photon,
your counting can’t be any more reliable than allowed by thermal noise, chem-
ical reactions can’t happen faster than loss of quantum coherence, and so on.
Could this be a general principle? Is it possible that, at least for crucial func-
tions which have been subjected to eons of evolutionary pressure, all biological
systems have found solutions which are optimal or extremal in this physicist’s
sense? If so, we have the start of a real program to describe these systems using
variational principles to pick out optimal functions, and then sharp questions
about how realistic dynamical models can implement this optimization. Even
if the real systems aren’t optimal, the exercise of understanding what the opti-
mal system might look like will help guide us in searching for new phenomena
and maybe in understanding some puzzling old phenomena. We’ll start on this
project in the next lecture.
3 Optimal performance at more complex tasks
Photon counting is pretty simple, so it might be a good idea to look at more
complex tasks and see if any notion of optimal performance still makes sense.
The most dramatic example is from bat echolocation, in a series of experiments
by Simmons and colleagues culminating in the demonstration that bats can
discriminate reliably among echoes that differ by just ∼ 10− 50 nanoseconds in
delay [31]. In these experiments, bats stand at the base of a Y with loudspeakers
on the two arms. Their ultrasonic calls are monitored by microphones and
returned through the loudspeakers with programmable delays. In a typical
experiment, the ‘artificial echoes’ produced by one side of the Y are at a fixed
delay τ , while the other side alternately produces delays of τ ± δτ . The bat is
trained to take a step toward the side which alternates, and the question is how
small we can make δτ and still have the bat make reliable decisions.
Early experiments from Simmons and coworkers suggested that delays differ-
ences of δτ ∼ 1µsec were detectable, and perhaps more surprisingly that delays
of ∼ 35µsec were less detectable. The latter result might make sense if the
bat were trying to measure delays by matching the detailed waveforms of the
call and echo, since these sounds have most of their power at frequencies near
f ∼ 1/(35µsec)—the bat can be confused by delay differences which correspond
to an integer number of periods in the acoustic waveform, and one can even see
the n = 2 ‘confusion resonance’ if one is careful.
The problem with these results on delay discrimination in the 1 − 50µsec
range is not that they are too precise but that they are not precise enough. One
can measure the background acoustic noise level (or add noise so that the level
is controlled) and given this noise level a detector which looks at the detailed
acoustic waveform and integrates over the whole call should be able to estimate
arrival times much more accurately than ∼ 1µsec,. Detailed calculations show
that the smallest detectable delay differences should be tens of nanoseconds. I
think this was viewed as so obviously absurd that it was grounds for throwing
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out the whole idea that the bat uses detailed waveform information.11 In an
absolutely stunning development, however, Simmons and company went back
to their experiments, produced delays in the appropriate range—convincing
yourself that you have control of acoustic and electronic delays with nanosecond
precision is not so simple—and found that the bats could do what they should be
able to do as ideal detectors. Further, they added noise in the background of the
echoes and showed that performance of the bats tracked the ideal performance
over a range of noise levels.
Problem 4: Head movements and delay accuracy. Just to be sure you under-
stand the scale of things ... . When bats are asked to make “ordinary” discriminations
in the Y apparatus, they move their head from arm to arm with each call. How accu-
rately would they have to reposition their head to be sure that the second echo from
one arm is not shifted by more than ∼ 1µsec? By more than 10 nsec? Explain the
behavioral strategy that bats could use to avoid this problem. Can you position (for
example) your hand with anything like the precision that the bat needs for its head
in these experiments?
Returning to vision, part of the problem with photon counting is that it
almost seems inappropriate to dignify such a simple task as detecting a flash of
light with the name “perception.” Barlow and colleagues have studied a variety
of problems that seem richer, in some cases reaching into the psychology litera-
ture for examples of gestalt phenomena—where our perception is of the whole
rather than its parts [32]. One such example is the recognition of symmetry in
otherwise random patterns. Suppose that we want to make a random texture
pattern. One way to do this is to draw the contrast C(~x) at each point ~x in the
image from some simple probability distribution that we can write down. An
example is to make a Gaussian random texture, which corresponds to
P [C(~x)] ∝ exp
[
−1
2
∫
d2x
∫
d2x′C(~x)K(~x− ~x′)C(~x′)
]
, (9)
where K(~x − ~x′) is the kernel or propagator that describe the texture. By
writing K as a function of the difference between coordinates we guarantee that
the texture is homogeneous; if we want the texture to be isotropic we take
K(~x − ~x′) = K(|~x − ~x′|). Using this scheme, how do we make a texture with
symmetry, say with respect to reflection across an axis?
The statement that texture has symmetry across an an axis is that for each
point ~x we can find the corresponding reflected point R · ~x, and that the con-
trasts at these two points are very similar; this should be true for every point.
This can be accomplished by choosing
Pγ [C(~x)] ∝ exp
[
−1
2
∫
d2x
∫
d2x′C(~x)K(~x− ~x′)C(~x′)
11The alternative is that the bat bases delay estimates on the envelope of the returning
echo, so that one is dealing with structures on the millisecond time scale, seemingly much
better matched to the intrinsic time scales of neurons.
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+
γ
2
∫
d2x|C(~x)− C(R · ~x)|2
]
, (10)
where γ measures the strength of the tendency toward symmetry. Clearly as
γ → ∞ we have an exactly symmetric pattern, quenching half of the degrees
of freedom in the original random texture. On the other hand, as γ → 0, the
weakly symmetric textures drawn from Pγ become almost indistinguishable from
a pure random texture (γ = 0). Given images of a certain size, and a known
kernel K, there is a limit to the smallest value of γ that can be distinguished
reliably from zero, and we can compare this statistical limit to the performance
of human observers. This is more or less what Barlow did, although he used
blurred random dots rather than the Gaussian textures considered here; the
idea is the same (and must be formally the same in the limit of many dots).
The result is that human observers come within a factor of two of the statistical
limit for detecting γ or its analog in the random dot patterns.
One can use similar sorts of visual stimuli to think about motion, where
rather than having to recognize a match between two halves of a possibly sym-
metric image we have to match successive frames of a movie. Here again human
observers can approach the statistical limits [33], as long as we stay in the right
regime: we seem not to make use of fine dot positioning (as would be gener-
ated if the kernel K only contained low order derivatives) nor can we integrate
efficiently over many frames. These results are interesting because they show
the potentialities and limitations of optimal visual computation, but also be-
cause the discrimination of motion in random movies is one of the places where
people have tried to make close links between perception and neural activity
in the (monkey) cortex [34]. In addition to symmetry and motion, other ex-
amples of optimal or near optimal performance include other visual texture
discriminations and auditory identification of complex pitches in the auditory
system; even bacteria can approach the limits set by physical noise sources as
they detect and react to chemical gradients, and there is a species of French
cave beetle that can sense milliKelvin temperature changes, almost at the limit
set by thermodynamic temperature fluctuations in their sensors.
I would like to discuss one case in detail, because it shows how much we
can learn by stepping back and looking for a simple example (in proper physics
tradition). Indeed, I believe that one of the crucial things one must do in working
at the interface of physics and biology is to take some particular biological
system and dive into the details. However much we believe in general principles,
we have to confront particular cases. In thinking about brains it would be nice to
have some “simple system” that we can explore, although one must admit that
the notion of a simple brain seems almost a non–sequitur. Humans tend to be
interested in the brains of other humans, but as physicists we know that we are
not at the center of the universe, and we might worry that excessive attention
to our own brains reflects a sort of preCopernican prejudice. It behooves us,
then, to look around the animal kingdom for accessible examples of what we
hope are general phenomena. For a variety of reasons, our attention is drawn
to invertebrates—animals without backbones—and to insects in particular.
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First, most of the animals on earth are insects, or, more precisely, arthro-
pods. Second, the nervous system of a typical invertebrate has far fewer neurons
than found in a mammal or even a ‘lower vertebrate’ such as a fish or frog. The
fly’s entire visual brain has roughly 5× 105 cells, while just the primary visual
cortex of a monkey has ∼ 109. Third, many of the cells in the invertebrate
nervous system are identified: cells of essentially the same structure occur in
every individual, and that if one records the response of these cells to sensory
stimuli (for example) these responses are reproducible from individual to indi-
vidual.12 Thus the cells can be named and numbered based on their structure
or function in the neural circuit.13 Finally, the overall physiology of inverte-
brates allows for very long, stable recordings of the electrical activity of their
neurons. In short, experiments on invertebrate nervous systems look and feel
like the physics experiments with which we all grew up—stable samples with
quantitatively reproducible behavior.
Of course what I give here is meant to sound like a rational account of
why one might choose the fly as a model system. In fact my own choice was
driven by the good fortune of finding myself as a postdoc in Groningen some
years ago, where in the next office Rob de Ruyter van Steveninck was work-
ing on his thesis. When Rob showed me the kinds of experiments he could
do—recording from a single neuron for a week, or from photoreceptor cells all
afternoon—we both realized that this was a golden opportunity to bring theory
and experiment together in studying a variety of problems in neural coding and
computation. Since this is a school, and hence the lectures have in part the
flavor of advice to students, I should point out that (1) the whole process of
theory/experiment collaboration was made easier by the fact that Rob himself
is a physicist, and indeed the Dutch were then far ahead of the rest of the world
in bringing biophysics into physics departments, but (2) despite all the positive
factors, including the fact that as postdoc and student we had little else to do, it
still took months for us to formulate a reasonable first step in our collaboration.
I admit that it is only after having some success with Rob that I have have had
the courage to venture into collaborations with real biologists.
What do flies actually do with their visual brains? If you watch a fly flying
around in a room or outdoors, you will notice that flight paths tend to consist
of rather straight segments interrupted by sharp turns. These observations can
be quantified through the measurement of trajectories during free [38, 39] or
lightly tethered [40, 41] flight and in experiments where the fly is suspended
from a torsion balance [42]. Given the aerodynamics for an object of the fly’s
dimensions, even flying straight is tricky. In the torsion balance one can demon-
12This should not be taken to mean that the properties of neurons in the fly’s brain are
fixed by genetics, or that all individuals in the species are identical. Indeed, we will come
to the question of individuality vs. universality in what follows. What is important here is
that neural responses are sufficiently reproducible that one can speak meaningfully about the
properties of corresponding cells in different individuals.
13If you want to know more about the structure of a fly’s brain, there is a beautiful book by
Strausfeld [35], but this is very hard to find. An alternative is the online flybrain project that
Strausfeld and others have been building [36]. Another good general reference is the collection
of articles edited by Stavenga and Hardie [37].
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strate directly that motion across the visual field drives the generation of torque,
and the sign is such as to stabilize flight against rigid body rotation of the fly.
Indeed one can close the feedback loop by measuring the torque which the fly
produces and using this torque to (counter)rotate the visual stimulus, creating
an imperfect ‘flight simulator’ for the fly in which the only cues to guide the
flight are visual; under natural conditions the fly’s mechanical sensors play a
crucial role. Despite the imperfections of the flight simulator, the tethered fly
will fixate small objects, thereby stabilizing the appearance of straight flight.
Similarly, Land and Collett showed that aspects of flight behavior under free
flight conditions can be understood if flies generate torques in response to mo-
tion across the visual field, and that this response is remarkably fast, with a
latency of just ∼ 30 msec [38]. The combination of free flight and torsion bal-
ance experiments strongly suggests that flies can estimate their angular velocity
from visual input alone, and then produce motor outputs based on this estimate
[42].
When you look down on the head of a fly, you see—almost to the exclusion
of anything else—the large compound eyes. Each little hexagon that you see
on the fly’s head is a separate lens, and in large flies there are ∼ 5, 000 lenses
in each eye, with approximately 1 receptor cell behind each lens,14 and roughly
100 brain cells per lens devoted to the processing of visual information. The
lens focuses light on the receptor, which is small enough to act as an optical
waveguide. Each receptor sees only a small portion of the world, just as in
our eyes; one difference between flies and us is that diffraction is much more
significant for organisms with compound eyes—because the lenses are so small,
flies have an angular resolution of about 1◦, while we do about 100× better.
There is a beautiful literature on optimization principles for the design of the
compound eye; the topic even makes an appearance in the Feynman lectures.
Voltage signals from the receptor cells are processed by several layers of the
brain, each layer having cells organized on a lattice which parallels the lattice
of lenses visible from the outside of the fly. After passing through the lamina,
the medulla, and the lobula, signals arrive at the lobula plate. Here there is a
stack of about 50 cells which are are sensitive to motion [44, 45]. The cells all
are identified in the sense defined above, and are specialized to detect different
kinds of motion. If one kills individual cells in the lobula plate then the simple
experiment of moving a stimulus and recording the flight torque no longer works
[46], strongly suggesting that these cells are an obligatory link in the pathway
from the retina to the flight motor. If one lets the fly watch a randomly moving
pattern, then it is possible to “decode” the responses of the movement sensitive
14This is the sort of sloppy physics speak which annoys biologists. The precise statement is
different in different insects. For flies there are eight receptors behind each lens. Two provide
sensitivity to polarization and some color vision, but these are not used for motion sensing.
The other six receptors look out through the same lens in different directions, but as one
moves to neighboring lenses one finds that there is one cell under each of six neighboring
lenses which looks in the same direction. Thus these six cells are equivalent to one cell with
six times larger photon capture cross section, and the signals from these cells are collected
and summed in the first processing stage (the lamina). One can even see the expected six fold
improvement in signal to noise ratio [43].
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neurons and to reconstruct the time dependent angular velocity signal [47], as
will be discussed below. Taken together, these observations support a picture
in which the fly’s brain uses photoreceptor signals to estimate angular velocity,
and encodes this estimate in the activity of a few neurons.15 Further, we can
study the photoreceptor signals (and noise) as well as the responses of motion–
sensitive neurons with a precision almost unmatched in any other set of neurons:
thus we have a good idea of what the system is “trying” to do, and we have
tremendous access to both inputs and outputs. I’ll try to make several points:
• Sequences of a few action spikes from the H1 neuron allow for discrimi-
nation among different motions with a precision close to the limit set by
noise in the photodetector array.
• With continuous motion, the spike train of H1 can be decoded to recover
a running estimate of the motion signal, and the precision of this estimate
is again within a factor of two of the theoretical limit.
• Analogies between the formal problem of optimal estimation and statisti-
cal physics help us to develop a theory of optimal estimation which predicts
the structure of the computation that the fly should do to achieve the most
reliable motion estimates.
• In several cases we can find independent evidence that the fly’s computa-
tion has the form predicted by optimal estimation theory, including some
features of the neural response that were found only after the theoretical
predictions.
We start by getting an order–of–magnitude feel for the theoretical limits.
Suppose that we look at a pattern of typical contrast C and it moves by an
angle δθ. A single photodetector element will see a change in contrast of roughly
δC ∼ C · (δθ/φ0), where φ0 is the angular scale of blurring due to diffraction. If
we can measure for a time τ , we will count an average number of photons Rτ ,
15Let me emphasize that you should be skeptical of any specific claim about what the brain
computes. The fact that flies can stabilize their flight using visual cues, for example, does not
mean that they compute motion in any precise sense—they could use a form of ‘bang–bang’
control that needs knowledge only of the algebraic sign of the velocity, although I think that the
torsion balance experiments argue against such a model. It also is a bit mysterious why we find
neurons with such understandable properties: one could imagine connecting photoreceptors to
flight muscles via a network of neurons in which there is nothing that we could recognize as a
motion–sensitive cell. Thus it is not obvious either that the fly must compute motion or that
there must be motion–sensitive neurons (one might make the same argument about whether
there needs to be a whole area of motion–sensitive neurons in primate cortex, as observed).
As you will see, when the dust settles I will claim that flies in fact compute motion optimally.
The direct evidence for this claim comes from careful examination of the responses of single
neurons. We don’t know why the fly goes to the trouble of doing this, and in particular it is
hard to point to a behavior in which this precision has been demonstrated experimentally (or
is plausibly necessary for survival). This is a first example of the laundry list problem: if the
brain makes optimal estimates of x, y and z, then we have an opening to a principled theory
of x−, y−, and z−perception and the corresponding neural responses, but we don’t know why
the system chooses to estimate x, y, z as opposed to x′, y′, and z′. Hang in there ... we’ll try
to address this too!
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with R the counting rate per detector, and hence the noise can be expressed a
fractional precision in intensity of ∼ 1/
√
Rτ . But fractional intensity is what we
mean by contrast, so 1/
√
Rτ is really the contrast noise in one photodetector.
To get the signal to noise ratio we should compare the signal and noise in each
of the Ncells detectors, then add the squares if we assume (as for photon shot
noise) that noise is independent in each detector while the signal is coherent.
The result is
SNR ∼ Ncells ·
(
δθ
φ0
)2
C2Rτ. (11)
This calculation is rough, and we can do a little better [4, 48], but it contains the
right ideas. Motion discrimination is hard for flies because they have small lenses
and hence blurry images (φ0 is large) and because they have to respond quickly
(τ is small). Under reasonable laboratory conditions the optimal estimator
would reach SNR = 1 at an angular displacement of δθ ∼ 0.05◦.
We can test the precision of motion estimation in two very different ways.
One is similar to the experiments described for photon counting or for bat
echolocation: we create two alternatives and ask if we can discriminate reliably.
For the motion sensitive neurons in the fly visual system Rob pursued this line
by recording the responses of a single neuron (H1, which is sensitive, not surpris-
ingly, to horizontal motions) to steps of motion that have either an amplitude
θ+ or an amplitude θ− [49]. The cell responds with a brief volley of action
potentials which we can label as occurring at times t1, t2, · · ·. We as observers
of the neuron can look at these times and try to decide whether the motion had
amplitude θ+ or θ−; the idea is exactly the same as in Problem 2, but here we
have to measure the distributions P±(t1, t2, · · ·) rather than making assumptions
about their form. Doing the integrals, one finds that looking at spikes generated
in the first ∼ 30msec after the step (as in the fly’s behavior) we can reach the
reliability expected for SNR = 1 at a displacement δθ = |θ+ − θ−| ∼ 0.12◦,
within a factor of two of the theoretical limit set by noise in the photodetectors.
These data are quite rich, and it is worth noting a few more points that emerged
from the analysis:
• On the ∼ 30msec time scale of relevance to behavior, there are only a
handful of spikes. This is partly what makes it possible to do the analysis
so completely, but it also is a lesson for how we think about the neural
representation of information in general.
• Dissecting the contributions of individual spikes, one finds that each suc-
cessive spike makes a nearly independent contribution to the signal to
noise ratio for discrimination, so there is essentially no redundancy.
• Even one or two spikes are enough to allow discrimination of motions much
smaller than the lattice spacing on the retina or the nominal “diffraction
limit” of angular resolution. Analogous phenomena have been known in
human vision for more than a century and are called hyperacuity; see
Section 4.2 in Spikes for a discussion [5].
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The step discrimination experiment gives us a very clear view of reliability in
the neural response, but as with the other discrimination experiments discussed
above it’s not a very natural task. An alternative is to ask what happens when
the motion signal (angular velocity θ˙(t)) is a complex function of time. Then we
can think of the signal to noise ratio in Eq. (11) as being equivalent to a spectral
density of displacement noise N effθ ∼ φ20/(NcellsC2R), or a generalization in
which the photon counting rate is replaced by an effective (frequency dependent)
rate related to the noise characteristics of the photoreceptors [48]. It seems likely,
as discussed above, that the fly’s visual system really does make a continuous
or running estimate of the angular velocity, and that this estimate is encoded
in the sequence of discrete spikes produced by neurons like H1. It is not clear
that any piece of the brain ever “decodes” this signal in an explicit way, but if
we could do such a decoding we could test directly whether the accuracy of our
decoding reaches the limiting noise level set by noise in the photodetectors.
The idea of using spike trains to recover continuous time dependent signals
started with this analysis of the fly visual system [47, 50, 51], and has since ex-
panded to many different systems [5]. Generalizations of these ideas to decoding
from populations of neurons [52] even have application to future prosthetic de-
vices which might be able to decode the commands given in motor cortex to
control robot arms [53]. Here our interest is not so much in the structure of the
code, or in the usefulness of the decoding; rather our goal is to use the decoding
as a tool to characterize the precision of the underlying computations.
To understand how we can decode a continuous signal from discrete se-
quences of spike it is helpful to have an example, following Ref. [51]. Suppose
that the signal of interest is s(t) and the neuron we are looking at generates
action potentials according to a Poisson process with a rate r(s). Then the
probability that we observe spikes at times t1, t2, · · · , tN ≡ {ti} given the signal
s(t) is (generalizing from Problem 1)
P [{ti}|s(t)] = 1
N !
exp
[
−
∫
dt r(s(t))
] N∏
i=1
r(s(ti)). (12)
For simplicity let us imagine further that the signal s itself comes from a Gaus-
sian distribution with zero mean, unit variance and a correlation time τc, so
that
P [s(t)] ∝ exp
[
− 1
4τc
∫
dt
(
τ2c s˙
2 + s2
)]
. (13)
Our problem is not to predict the spikes from the signal, but rather given the
spikes to estimate the signal, which means that we are interested in conditional
distribution P [s(t)|{ti}]. From Bayes’ rule,
P [s(t)|{ti}] = P [{ti}|s(t)]P [s(t)]
P [{ti}] (14)
∝ exp
[
−τc
4
∫
dt s˙2 −
∫
dtVeff(s(t))
] N∏
i=1
r(s(ti)),
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(15)
where
Veff(s) =
1
4τc
s2 + r(s). (16)
I write the probability distribution in this form to remind you of the (Euclidean)
path integral description of quantum mechanics, where the amplitude for a
particle of mass m to move along a trajectory x(t) in a potential V (x) is given
by
A[x(t)] ∝ exp
[
−m
2
∫
dt x˙2 −
∫
dtV (x(t))
]
, (17)
in units where h¯ = 1. If we want to estimate s(t) from the probability distribu-
tion P [s(t)|{ti}], then we can compute the conditional mean, which will give us
the best estimator in the sense that χ2 between our estimate and the true signal
will be minimized (see Problem 5 below). Thus the estimate at some particular
time t0 is given by
sest(t0) =
∫
Ds(t) s(t0)P [s(t)|{ti}] (18)
∝
〈
s(t0)
N∏
i=1
r(s(ti))
〉
, (19)
where 〈· · ·〉 stands for an expectation value over trajectories drawn from the
distribution
Peff [s(t)] ∝ exp
[
−τc
4
∫
dt s˙2 −
∫
dtVeff(s(t))
]
. (20)
Thus estimating the trajectory involves computing an N + 1–point function in
the quantum mechanics problem defined by the potential Veff .
Problem 5: Optimal estimators. Imagine that you observe y, which is related to
another variable x that you actually would like to know. This relationship can be de-
scribed by the joint probability distribution P (x, y), which you know. Any estimation
strategy can be described as computing some function xest = F (y). For any estimate
we can compute the expected value of χ2,
χ2 =
∫
dxdyP (x, y)|x− F (y)|2. (21)
Show that the estimation strategy which minimizes χ2 is the computation of the
conditional mean,
Fopt(y) =
∫
dxxP (x|y). (22)
If we took any particular model seriously we could in fact try to compute
the relevant expectation values, but here (and in applications of these ideas to
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analysis of real neurons) I don’t really want to trust these details; rather I want
to focus on some general features. First one should note that trying to do the
calculations in a naive perturbation theory will work only in some very limited
domain. Simple forms of perturbation theory are equivalent to the statement
that interesting values of the signal s(t) do not sample strongly nonlinear regions
of the input/output relation r(s), and this is unlikely to be true in general. On
the other hand, there is a chance to do something simple, and this is a cluster
expansion:〈
s(t0)
N∏
i=1
r(s(ti))
〉
≈ 〈s(t0)〉
N∏
i=1
〈r(s(ti))〉
+A
N∑
i=1
〈δs(t0)δr(s(ti))〉+ · · · , (23)
where δs refers to fluctuations around around the mean 〈s〉, and similarly for r,
while A is a constant. As with the usual cluster expansions in statistical physics,
this does not require perturbations to be weak; in particular the relation r(s)
can have arbitrarily strong (even discontinuous) nonlinearities. What is needed
for a cluster expansion to make sense is that the times which appear in the
N–point functions be far apart when measured in units of the correlation times
for the underlying trajectories. In the present case, this will happen (certainly)
if the times between spikes are long compared with the correlation times of the
signal. Interestingly, as the mean spike rate gets higher, it is the correlation
times computed in the full Veff(s) which are important, and these are smaller
than the bare correlation time in many cases. At least in this class of models,
then, there is a regime of low spike rate where we can use a cluster expansion,
and this regime extends beyond the naive crossover determined by the number
of spikes per correlation time of s. As explained in Spikes, there are good reasons
to think that many neurons actually operate in this limit of spike trains which
are “sparse in the time domain” [5].
What are the consequences of the cluster expansion? If we can get away
with keeping the leading term, and if we don’t worry about constant offsets in
our estimates (which can’t be relevant ... ), then we have
sest(t) =
N∑
i=1
f(t− ti) + · · · , (24)
where f(t) again is something we could calculate if we trusted the details of the
model. But this is very simple: we can estimate a continuous time dependent
signal just by adding up contributions from individual spikes, or equivalently
by filtering the sequence of spikes. If we don’t want to trust a calculation of
f(t) we can just use experiments to find f(t) by asking for that function which
gives us the smallest value of χ2 between our estimate and the real signal, and
this optimization problem is also simple since χ2 is quadratic in f [5, 47]. So
the path is clear—do a long experiment on the response of a neuron to signals
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drawn from some distribution P [s(t)], use the first part of the experiment to
find the filter f(t) such that the estimate in Eq. (24) minimizes χ2, and then
test the accuracy of our estimates on the remainder of the data. This is exactly
what we did with H1 [47], and we found that over a broad range of frequencies
the spectral density of errors in our estimates was within a factor of two of
the limit set by noise in the photoreceptor cells. Further, we could change, for
example, the image contrast and show that the resulting error spectrum scaled
as expected from the theoretical limit [5].
To the extent that the fly’s brain can estimate motion with a precision close
to the theoretical limit, one thing we know is that the act of processing itself
does not add too much noise. But being quiet is not enough: to make maximally
reliable estimates of nontrivial stimulus features like motion one must be sure to
do the correct computation. To understand how this works let’s look at a simple
example, and then I’ll outline what happens when we use the same formalism
to look at motion estimation. My discussion here follows joint work with Marc
Potters [54].
Suppose that someone draws a random number x from a probability distri-
bution P (x). Rather than seeing x itself, you get to see only a noisy version,
y = x + η, where η is drawn from a Gaussian distribution with variance σ2.
Having seen y, your job is to estimate x, and for simplicity let’s say that the
“best estimate” is best in the least squares sense, as above. Then from Problem
5 we know that the optimal estimator is the conditional mean,
xest(y) =
∫
dxxP (x|y). (25)
Now we use Bayes’ rule and push things through:
xest(y) =
∫
dxxP (y|x)P (x) 1
P (y)
(26)
=
1
P (y)
1√
2πσ2
∫
dxxP (x) exp
[
− 1
2σ2
(y − x)2
]
(27)
=
1
Z(y)
∫
dxx exp
[
−Veff(x)
kBTeff
+
Feffx
kBTeff
]
, (28)
where we can draw the analogy with statistical mechanics by noting the corre-
spondences:
Veff(x)
kBTeff
= − lnP (x) + x
2
2σ2
(29)
kBTeff = σ
2 (30)
Feff = y. (31)
Thus, making optimal estimates involves computing expectation values of po-
sition, the potential is (almost) the prior distribution, the noise level is the
temperature, and the data act as an external force. The connection with sta-
tistical mechanics is more than a convenient analogy; it helps us in finding
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Statistical mechanics Optimal Estimation
Temperature Noise level
Potential (log) Prior distribution
Average position Estimate
External force Input data
approximation schemes. Thus at large noise levels we are at high temperatures,
and all other things being equal the force is effectively small so we can com-
pute the response to this force in perturbation theory. On the other hand, at
low noise levels the computation of expectation values must be dominated by
ground state or saddle point configurations.
In the case of visual motion estimation, the data are the voltages produced by
the photoreceptors {Vn(t)} and the thing we are trying to estimate is the angular
velocity θ˙(t). These are functions rather than numbers, but this isn’t such a big
deal if we are used to doing functional integrals. The really new point is that θ˙(t)
does not directly determine the voltages. What happens instead is that even if
the fly flies along a perfectly straight path, so that θ˙ = 0, the world effectively
projects a movie C(x, t) onto the retina and it is this movie which determines the
voltages (up to noise). The motion θ(t) transforms this movie, and so enters in
a strongly nonlinear way; if we take a one dimensional approximation we might
write C(x, t) → C(x − θ(t), t). Each photodetector responds to the contrast as
seen through an aperture function M(x− xn) centered on a lattice point xn in
the retina, and for simplicity let’s take the noise to be dominated by photon
shot noise. Since we have independent knowledge of the C(x, t), to describe
the relationship between θ˙(t) and {Vn(t)} we have to integrate over all possible
movies, weighted by their probability of occurrence P [C].
Putting all of these things together with our general scheme for finding
optimal estimates, we have
θ˙est(t0) =
∫
Dθ θ˙(t0)P [θ(t)|{Vn(t)}] (32)
P [θ(t)|{Vn(t)}] = P [{Vn(t)}|θ(t)]P [θ(t)] 1
P [{Vn(t)}] (33)
P [{Vn(t)}|θ(t)] ∝
∫
DC P [C] exp
[
−R
2
∑
n
∫
dt |Vn(t)− V¯n(t)|2
]
(34)
V¯n(t) =
∫
dxM(x− xn)C(x − θ(t), t). (35)
Of course we can’t do these integrals exactly, but we can look for approxima-
tions, and again we can do perturbation theory at low signal to noise levels and
search for saddle points at high signal to noise ratios. When the dust settles we
find [54]:
• At low signal to noise ratios the optimal estimator is quadratic in the
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receptor voltages,
θ˙est(t) ≈
∑
nm
∫
dτ
∫
dτ ′Vn(t− τ)Knm(τ, τ ′)Vm(t− τ ′). (36)
• At moderate signal to noise ratios, terms with higher powers of the voltage
become relevant and ‘self energy’ terms provide corrections to the kernel
Knm(τ, τ
′).
• At high signal to noise ratios averaging over time becomes less important
and the optimal estimator crosses over to
θ˙est(t) ≈
∑
n V˙n(t)[Vn(t)− Vn−1(t)]
constant +
∑
n[Vn(t)− Vn−1(t)]2
, (37)
where constant depends on the typical contrast and dynamics in the
movies chosen from P [C(x, t)] and on the typical scale of angular velocities
in P [θ(t)].
Before looking at the two limits in detail, note that the whole form of the motion
computation depends on the statistical properties of the visual environment.
Although the limits look very different, one can show that there is no phase
transition and hence that increasing signal to noise ratio takes us smoothly
from one limit to the other; although this is sort of a side point, it was a really
nice piece of work by Marc. An obvious question is whether the fly is capable
of doing these different computations under different conditions.
We can understand the low signal to noise ratio limit by realizing that when
something moves there are correlations between what we see at the two space–
time points (x, t) and (x + vτ, t + τ). These correlations extend to very high
orders, but as the background noise level increases the higher order correlations
are corrupted first, until finally the only reliable thing left is the two–point
function, and closer examination shows that near neighbor correlations are the
most significant: we can be sure something is moving because signals in neigh-
boring photodetectors are correlated with a slight delay. This form of “corre-
lation based” motion computation was suggested long ago by Reichardt and
Hassenstein based on behavioral experiments with beetles [55]; later work from
Reichardt and coworkers explored the applicability of this model to fly behavior
[42]. Once the motion sensitive neurons were discovered it was natural to check
if their responses could be understood in these terms.
There are two clear signatures of the correlation model. First, since the
receptor voltage is linear in response to image contrast, the correlation model
confounds contrast with velocity: all things being equal, doubling the image
contrast causes our estimate of the velocity to increase by a factor of four (!).
This is an observed property of the flight torque that flies generate in response
to visual motion, at least at low contrasts, and the same quadratic behavior can
be seen in the rate at which motion sensitive neurons generate spikes and even
in human perception (at very low contrast). Although this might seem strange,
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it’s been known for decades. What is interesting here is that this seemingly
disastrous confounding of signals occurs even in the optimal estimator: optimal
estimation involves a tradeoff between systematic and random errors, and at
low signal to noise ratio this tradeoff pushes us toward making larger systematic
errors, apparently of a form made by real brains.
The second signature of correlation computation is that we can produce
movies which have the right spatiotemporal correlations to generate a nonzero
estimate θ˙est but don’t really have anything in them that we would describe
as “moving” objects or features. Rob de Ruyter has a simple recipe for doing
this [56], which is quite compelling (I recommend you try it yourself): Make a
spatiotemporal white noise movie ψ(~x, t),
〈ψ(~x, t)ψ(~x′, t′)〉 = δ(~x− ~x′)δ(t− t′), (38)
and then add the movie to itself with a weight and an offset:
C(~x, t) = ψ(~x, t) + aψ(~x+∆~x, t+∆t). (39)
Composed of pure noise, there is nothing really moving here. If you watch the
movie, however, there is no question that you think it’s moving, and the fly’s
neurons respond too (just like yours, presumably). Even more impressive is that
if you change the sign of the weight a ... the direction of motion reverses, as
predicted from the correlation model.
Because the correlation model has a long history, it is hard to view evidence
for this model as a success of optimal estimation theory. The theory of optimal
estimation also predicts, however, that the kernel Knm(τ, τ
′) should adapt to
the statistics of the visual environment, and it does. Most dramatically one
can just show random movies with different correlation times and then probe
the transient response of H1 to step motions; the time course of transients
(presumably reflecting the details of K) can vary over nearly two orders of
magnitude from 30–300 msec in response to different correlation times [56]. All
of this makes sense in light of optimal estimation theory but again perhaps is not
a smoking gun. Closer to a real test is Rob’s argument that the absolute values
of the time constants seen in such adaptation experiments match the frequencies
at which natural movies would fall below SNR = 1 in each photoreceptor, so
that filtering in the visual system is set (adaptively) to fit the statistics of signals
and noise in the inputs [56, 57].
What about the high SNR limit? If we remember that voltages are linear in
contrast, and let ourselves ignore the lattice in favor of a continuum limit, then
the high SNR limit has a simple structure,
θ˙est(t) ≈
∫
dx (∂tC)(∂xC)
B +
∫
dx (∂xC)2
→ ∂tC
∂xC
, (40)
where the last limit is at high contrasts. As promised by the lack of a phase
transition, this starts as a quadratic function of contrast just like the correlator,
but saturates as the ratio of temporal and spatial derivatives. Note that if
C(x, t) = C(x+ vt), then this ratio recovers the velocity v exactly. This simple
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ratio computation is not optimal in general because real movies have dynamics
other than rigid motion and real detectors have noise, but there is a limit in
which it must be the right answer. Interestingly, the correlation model (with
multiplicative nonlinearity) and the ratio of derivatives model (with a divisive
nonlinearity) have been viewed as mutually exclusive models of how brains might
compute motion. One of the really nice results of optimal estimation theory is
to see these seemingly very different models emerge as different limits of a more
general strategy. But, do flies know about this more general strategy?
The high SNR limit of optimal estimation predicts that the motion estimate
(and hence, for example, the rate at which motion sensitive neurons generate
spikes) should saturate as a function of contrast, but this contrast–saturated
level should vary with velocity. Further, if one traces through the calculations
in more detail, the the constant B and hence the contrast level required for
(e. g.) half–saturation should depend on the typical contrast and light intensity
in the environment. Finally, this dependence on the environment really is a
response to the statistics of that environment, and hence the system must use
some time and a little ‘memory’ to keep track of these statistics—the contrast
response function should reflect the statistics of movies in the recent past. All
of these things are observed [56, 57, 58].
So, where are we? The fly’s visual system makes nearly optimal estimates of
motion under at least some conditions that we can probe in the lab. The theory
of optimal estimation predicts that the structure of the motion computation
ought to have some surprising properties, and many of these are observed—
some were observed only when theory said to go look for them, which always
is better. I would like to get a clearer demonstration that the system really
takes a ratio, and I think we’re close to doing that [59]. Meanwhile, one might
worry that theoretical predictions depend too much on assumptions about the
structure of the relevant probability distributions P [C] and P [θ], so Rob is
doing experiments where he walks through the woods with both a camera and
gyroscope mounted on his head (!), sampling the joint distribution of movies and
motion trajectories. Armed with these samples one can do all of the relevant
functional integrals by Monte Carlo, which really is lovely since now we are
in the real natural distribution of signals. I am optimistic that all of this will
soon converge on a complete picture. I also believe that the success so far is
sufficient to motivate a more general look at the problem of optimization as a
design principle in neural computation.
4 Toward a general principle?
One attempt to formulate a general principle for neural computation goes back
to the work of Attneave [60] and Barlow [61, 62] in the 1950s. Focusing on
the processing of sensory information, they suggested that an important goal
of neural computation is to provide an efficient representation of the incoming
data, where the intuitive notion of efficiency could be made precise using the
ideas of information theory [63].
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Imagine describing an image by giving the light intensity in each pixel. Al-
ternatively, we could give a description in terms of objects and their locations.
The latter description almost certainly is more efficient in a sense that can be
formalized using information theory. The idea of Barlow and Attneave was to
turn this around—perhaps by searching for maximally efficient representations
of natural scenes we would be forced to discover and recognize the objects out of
which our perceptions are constructed. Efficient representation would have the
added advantage of allowing the communication of information from one brain
region to another (or from eye to brain along the optic nerve) with a minimal
number of nerve fibers or even a minimal number of action potentials. How
could we test these ideas?
• If we make a model for the class of computations that neurons can do, then
we could try to find within this class the one computation that optimizes
some information theoretic measure of performance. This should lead to
predictions for what real neurons are doing at various stages of sensory
processing.
• We could try to make a direct measurement of the efficiency with which
neurons represent sensory information.
• Because efficient representations depend on the statistical structure of the
signals we are trying to represent, a truly efficient brain would adapt its
strategies to track changes in these statistics, and we could search for this
“statistical adaptation.” Even better would be if we could show that the
adaptation has the right form to optimize efficiency.
Before getting started on this program we need a little review of information
theory itself.16 Almost all statistical mechanics textbooks note that the entropy
of a gas measures our lack of information about the microscopic state of the
molecules, but often this connection is left a bit vague or qualitative. Shannon
proved a theorem that makes the connection precise [63]: entropy is the unique
measure of available information consistent with certain simple and plausible
requirements. Further, entropy also answers the practical question of how much
space we need to use in writing down a description of the signals or states that
we observe.
Two friends, Max and Allan, are having a conversation. In the course of
the conversation, Max asks Allan what he thinks of the headline story in this
morning’s newspaper. We have the clear intuitive notion that Max will ‘gain
information’ by hearing the answer to his question, and we would like to quantify
this intuition. Following Shannon’s reasoning, we begin by assuming that Max
knows Allan very well. Allan speaks very proper English, being careful to follow
the grammatical rules even in casual conversation. Since they have had many
16At Les Houches this review was accomplished largely by handing out notes based on
courses given at MIT, Princeton and ICTP in 1998–99. In principle they will become part of
a book to be published by Princeton University Press, tentatively titled Entropy, Information
and the Brain. I include this here so that the presentation is self–contained, and apologize for
the eventual self–plagiarism that may occur.
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political discussions Max has a rather good idea about how Allan will react to
the latest news. Thus Max can make a list of Allan’s possible responses to his
question, and he can assign probabilities to each of the answers. From this list
of possibilities and probabilities we can compute an entropy, and this is done in
exactly the same way as we compute the entropy of a gas in statistical mechanics
or thermodynamics: If the probability of the nth possible response is pn, then
the entropy is
S = −
∑
n
pn log2 pn bits. (41)
The entropy S measures Max’s uncertainty about what Allan will say in
response to his question. Once Allan gives his answer, all this uncertainty is
removed—one of the responses occurred, corresponding to p = 1, and all the
others did not, corresponding to p = 0—so the entropy is reduced to zero. It
is appealing to equate this reduction in our uncertainty with the information
we gain by hearing Allan’s answer. Shannon proved that this is not just an
interesting analogy; it is the only definition of information that conforms to
some simple constraints.
To start, Shannon assumes that the information gained on hearing the an-
swer can be written as a function of the probabilities pn.
17 Then if all N possible
answers are equally likely the information gained should be a monotonically in-
creasing function of N . The next constraint is that if our question consists of
two parts, and if these two parts are entirely independent of one another, then
we should be able to write the total information gained as the sum of the in-
formation gained in response to each of the two subquestions. Finally, more
general multipart questions can be thought of as branching trees, where the
answer to each successive part of the question provides some further refinement
of the probabilities; in this case we should be able to write the total information
gained as the weighted sum of the information gained at each branch point.
Shannon proved that the only function of the {pn} consistent with these three
postulates—monotonicity, independence, and branching—is the entropy S, up
to a multiplicative constant.
If we phrase the problem of gaining information from hearing the answer to a
question, then it is natural to think about a discrete set of possible answers. On
the other hand, if we think about gaining information from the acoustic wave-
form that reaches our ears, then there is a continuum of possibilities. Naively,
we are tempted to write
Scontinuum = −
∫
dxP (x) log2 P (x), (42)
or some multidimensional generalization. The difficulty, of course, is that prob-
ability distributions for continuous variables [like P (x) in this equation] have
units—the distribution of x has units inverse to the units of x—and we should
17In particular, this ‘zeroth’ assumption means that we must take seriously the notion of
enumerating the possible answers. In this framework we cannot quantify the information that
would be gained upon hearing a previously unimaginable answer to our question.
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be worried about taking logs of objects that have dimensions. Notice that if
we wanted to compute a difference in entropy between two distributions, this
problem would go away. This is a hint that only entropy differences are going
to be important.18
Returning to the conversation between Max and Allan, we assumed that
Max would receive a complete answer to his question, and hence that all his
uncertainty would be removed. This is an idealization, of course. The more
natural description is that, for example, the world can take on many states
W , and by observing data D we learn something but not everything about
W . Before we make our observations, we know only that states of the world
are chosen from some distribution P (W ), and this distribution has an entropy
S(W ). Once we observe some particular datum D, our (hopefully improved)
knowledge of W is described by the conditional distribution P (W |D), and this
has an entropy S(W |D) that is smaller than S(W ) if we have reduced our
uncertainty about the state of the world by virtue of our observations. We
identify this reduction in entropy as the information that we have gained about
W .
Problem 6: Maximally informative experiments. Imagine that we are trying
to gain information about the correct theory T describing some set of phenomena.
At some point, our relative confidence in one particular theory is very high; that is,
P (T = T∗) > F · P (T 6= T∗) for some large F . On the other hand, there are many
possible theories, so our absolute confidence in the theory T∗ might nonetheless be
quite low, P (T = T∗) << 1. Suppose we follow the ‘scientific method’ and design
an experiment that has a yes or no answer, and this answer is perfectly correlated
with the correctness of theory T∗, but uncorrelated with the correctness of any other
possible theory—our experiment is designed specifically to test or falsify the currently
most likely theory. What can you say about how much information you expect to gain
from such a measurement? Suppose instead that you are completely irrational and
design an experiment that is irrelevant to testing T∗ but has the potential to eliminate
many (perhaps half) of the alternatives. Which experiment is expected to be more
informative? Although this is a gross cartoon of the scientific process, it is not such
18The problem of defining the entropy for continuous variables is familiar in statistical
mechanics. In the simple example of an ideal gas in a finite box, we know that the quantum
version of the problem has a discrete set of states, so that we can compute the entropy of the
gas as a sum over these states. In the limit that the box is large, sums can be approximated
as integrals, and if the temperature is high we expect that quantum effects are negligible and
one might naively suppose that Planck’s constant should disappear from the results; we recall
that this is not quite the case. Planck’s constant has units of momentum times position, and
so is an elementary area for each pair of conjugate position and momentum variables in the
classical phase space; in the classical limit the entropy becomes (roughly) the logarithm of the
occupied volume in phase space, but this volume is measured in units of Planck’s constant.
If we had tried to start with a classical formulation (as did Boltzmann and Gibbs, of course)
then we would find ourselves with the problems of Eq. (42), namely that we are trying to
take the logarithm of a quantity with dimensions. If we measure phase space volumes in
units of Planck’s constant, then all is well. The important point is that the problems with
defining a purely classical entropy do not stop us from calculating entropy differences, which
are observable directly as heat flows, and we shall find a similar situation for the information
content of continuous (“classical”) variables.
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a terrible model of a game like “twenty questions.” It is interesting to ask whether
people play such question games following strategies that might seem irrational but
nonetheless serve to maximize information gain [64]. Related but distinct criteria for
optimal experimental design have been developed in the statistical literature [65].
Perhaps this is the point to note that a single observation D is not, in
fact, guaranteed to provide positive information, as emphasized by DeWeese
and Meister [66]. Consider, for instance, data which tell us that all of our
previous measurements have larger error bars than we thought: clearly such
data, at an intuitive level, reduce our knowledge about the world and should
be associated with a negative information. Another way to say this is that
some data points D will increase our uncertainty about state W of the world,
and hence for these particular data the conditional distribution P (W |D) has
a larger entropy than the prior distribution P (D). If we identify information
with the reduction in entropy, ID = S(W )−S(W |D), then such data points are
associated unambiguously with negative information. On the other hand, we
might hope that, on average, gathering data corresponds to gaining information:
although single data points can increase our uncertainty, the average over all
data points does not.
If we average over all possible data—weighted, of course, by their probability
of occurrence P (D), we obtain the average information that D provides about
W ,
I(D →W ) = S(W )−
∑
D
P (D)S(W |D) (43)
=
∑
W
∑
D
P (W,D) log2
[
P (W,D)
P (W )P (D)
]
. (44)
Note that the information which D provides aboutW is symmetric in D andW .
This means that we can also view the state of the world as providing information
about the data we will observe, and this information is, on average, the same as
the data will provide about the state of the world. This ‘information provided’
is therefore often called the mutual information, and this symmetry will be very
important in subsequent discussions; to remind ourselves of this symmetry we
write I(D;W ) rather than I(D →W ).
Problem 7: Positivity of information. Prove that the mutual information I(D →
W ), defined in Eq. (44), is positive.
One consequence of the symmetry or mutuality of information is that we
can write
I(D;W ) = S(W )−
∑
D
P (D)S(W |D) (45)
= S(D)−
∑
W
P (W )S(D|W ). (46)
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If we consider only discrete sets of possibilities then entropies are positive (or
zero), so that these equations imply
I(D;W ) ≤ S(W ) (47)
I(D;W ) ≤ S(D). (48)
The first equation tells us that by observing D we cannot learn more about
the world then there is entropy in the world itself. This makes sense: entropy
measures the number of possible states that the world can be in, and we cannot
learn more than we would learn by reducing this set of possibilities down to
one unique state. Although sensible (and, of course, true), this is not a terribly
powerful statement: seldom are we in the position that our ability to gain
knowledge is limited by the lack of possibilities in the world around us.19 The
second equation, however, is much more powerful. It says that, whatever may
be happening in the world, we can never learn more than the entropy of the
distribution that characterizes our data. Thus, if we ask how much we can learn
about the world by taking readings from a wind detector on top of the roof, we
can place a bound on the amount we learn just by taking a very long stream of
data, using these data to estimate the distribution P (D), and then computing
the entropy of this distribution.
The entropy of our observations20 thus limits how much we can learn no
matter what question we were hoping to answer, and so we can think of the
entropy as setting (in a slight abuse of terminology) the capacity of the data
D to provide or to convey information. As an example, the entropy of neural
responses sets a limit to how much information a neuron can provide about the
world, and we can estimate this limit even if we don’t yet understand what it is
that the neuron is telling us (or the rest of the brain). Similarly, our bound on
the information conveyed by the wind detector does not require us to understand
how these data might be used to make predictions about tomorrow’s weather.
Since the information we can gain is limited by the entropy, it is natural
to ask if we can put limits on the entropy using some low order statistical
properties of the data: the mean, the variance, perhaps higher moments or
correlation functions, ... . In particular, if we can say that the entropy has a
maximum value consistent with the observed statistics, then we have placed a
firm upper bound on the information that these data can convey.
The problem of finding the maximum entropy given some constraint again
is familiar from statistical mechanics: the Boltzmann distribution is the dis-
tribution that has the largest possible entropy given the mean energy. More
19This is not quite true. There is a tradition of studying the nervous system as it responds
to highly simplified signals, and under these conditions the lack of possibilities in the world
can be a significant limitation, substantially confounding the interpretation of experiments.
20In the same way that we speak about the entropy of a gas I will often speak about the
entropy of a variable or the entropy of a response. In the gas, we understand from statistical
mechanics that the entropy is defined not as a property of the gas but as a property of the
distribution or ensemble from which the microscopic states of the gas are chosen; similarly we
should really speak here about “the entropy of the distribution of observations,” but this is a
bit cumbersome. I hope that the slightly sloppy but more compact phrasing does not cause
confusion.
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generally, let us imagine that we have knowledge not of the whole probability
distribution P (D) but only of some expectation values,
〈fi〉 =
∑
D
P (D)fi(D), (49)
where we allow that there may be several expectation values known (i = 1, 2, ...,K).
Actually there is one more expectation value that we always know, and this is
that the average value of one is one; the distribution is normalized:
〈f0〉 =
∑
D
P (D) = 1. (50)
Given the set of numbers {〈f0〉, 〈f1〉, · · · , 〈fK〉} as constraints on the probability
distribution P (D), we would like to know the largest possible value for the
entropy, and we would like to find explicitly the distribution that provides this
maximum.
The problem of maximizing a quantity subject to constraints is formu-
lated using Lagrange multipliers. In this case, we want to maximize S =
−∑P (D) log2 P (D), so we introduce a function S˜, with one Lagrange mul-
tiplier λi for each constraint:
S˜[P (D)] = −
∑
D
P (D) log2 P (D)−
K∑
i=0
λi〈fi〉 (51)
= − 1
ln 2
∑
D
P (D) lnP (D)−
K∑
i=0
λi
∑
D
P (D)fi(D). (52)
Our problem is then to find the maximum of the function S˜, but this is easy
because the probability for each value of D appears independently. The result
is that
P (D) =
1
Z
exp
[
−
K∑
i=1
λifi(D)
]
, (53)
where Z = exp(1 + λ0) is a normalization constant.
Problem 8: Details. Derive Eq. (53). In particular, show that Eq. (53) provides
a probability distribution which genuinely maximizes the entropy, rather than being
just an extremum.
These ideas are enough to get started on “designing” some simple neural
processes. Imagine, following Laughlin [67], that a neuron is responsible for
representing a single number such as the light intensity I averaged over small
patch of the retina (don’t worry about time dependence). Assume that this
signal will be represented by a continuous voltage V , which is true for the first
stages of processing in vision. This voltage is encoded into discrete spikes only
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as a second or third step. The information that the voltage provides about the
intensity is
I(V → I) =
∫
dI
∫
dV P (V, I) log2
[
P (V, I)
P (V )P (I)
]
(54)
=
∫
dI
∫
dV P (V, I) log2
[
P (V |I)
P (V )
]
. (55)
The conditional distribution P (V |I) describes the process by which the neuron
responds to its input, and so this is what we should try to “design.”
Let us suppose that the voltage is on average a nonlinear function of the
intensity, and that the dominant source of noise is additive (to the voltage),
independent of light intensity, and small compared with the overall dynamic
range of the cell:
V = g(I) + ξ, (56)
with some distribution Pnoise(ξ) for the noise. Then the conditional distribution
P (V |I) = Pnoise(V − g(I)), (57)
and the entropy of this conditional distribution can be written as
Scond = −
∫
dV P (V |I) log2 P (V |I) (58)
= −
∫
dξ Pnoise(ξ) log2 Pnoise(ξ). (59)
Note that this is a constant, independent both of the light intensity and of the
nonlinear input/output relation g(I). This is useful because we can write the
information as a difference between the total entropy of the output variable V
and this conditional or noise entropy, as in Eq. (46):
I(V → I) = −
∫
dV P (V ) log2 P (V )− Scond. (60)
With Scond constant independent of our ‘design,’ maximizing information is
the same as maximizing the entropy of the distribution of output voltages.
Assuming that there are maximum and minimum values for this voltage, but no
other constraints, then the maximum entropy distribution is just the uniform
distribution within the allowed dynamic range. But if the noise is small it
doesn’t contribute much to broadening P (V ) and we calculate this distribution
as if there were no noise, so that
P (V )dV = P (I)dI, (61)
dV
dI =
1
P (V )
· P (I). (62)
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Since we want to have V = g(I) and P (V ) = 1/(Vmax − Vmin), we find
dg(I)
dI = (Vmax − Vmin)P (I), (63)
g(I) = (Vmax − Vmin)
∫ I
Imin
dI ′P (I ′). (64)
Thus, the optimal input/output relation is proportional to the cumulative prob-
ability distribution of the input signals.
The predictions of Eq. (64) are quite interesting. First of all it makes clear
that any theory of the nervous system which involves optimizing information
transmission or efficiency of representation inevitably predicts that the compu-
tations done by the nervous system must be matched to the statistics of sensory
inputs (and, presumably, to the statistics of motor outputs as well). Here the
matching is simple: in the right units we could just read off the distribution of
inputs by looking at the (differentiated) input/output relation of the neuron.
Second, this simple model automatically carries some predictions about adapta-
tion to overall light levels. If we live in a world with diffuse light sources that are
not directly visible, then the intensity which reaches us at a point is the product
of the effective brightness of the source and some local reflectances. As is it gets
dark outside the reflectances don’t change—these are material properties—and
so we expect that the distribution P (I) will look the same except for scaling.
Equivalently, if we view the input as the log of the intensity, then to a good
approximation P (log I) just shifts linearly along the log I axis as mean light
intensity goes up and down. But then the optimal input/output relation g(I)
would exhibit a similar invariant shape with shifts along the input axis when
expressed as a function of log I, and this is in rough agreement with experiments
on light/dark adaptation in a wide variety of visual neurons. Finally, although
obviously a simplified version of the real problem facing even the first stages
of visual processing, this calculation does make a quantitative prediction that
would be tested if we measure both the input/output relations of early visual
neurons and the distribution of light intensities that the animal encounters in
nature.
Laughlin [67] made this comparison (20 years ago!) for the fly visual sys-
tem. He built an electronic photodetector with aperture and spectral sensitivity
matched to those of the fly retina and used his photodetector to scan natural
scenes, measuring P (I) as it would appear at the input to these neurons. In par-
allel he characterized the second order neurons of the fly visual system—the large
monopolar cells which receive direct synaptic input from the photoreceptors—
by measuring the peak voltage response to flashes of light. The agreement with
Eq. (64) was remarkable, especially when we remember that there are no free
parameters. While there are obvious open questions (what happened to time
dependence?), this is a really beautiful result.
Laughlin’s analysis focused on the nonlinear input/output properties of neu-
rons but ignored dynamics. An alternative which has been pursued by several
groups is to treat dynamics but to ignore nonlinearity [68, 69], and we tried
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to review some of these ideas in section 5.3 of Spikes [5]. As far as I know
there is not much work which really brings together dynamics and nonlinearity,
although there are striking results about filtering and nonlinearity in the color
domain [70]. While these model problems capture something about real neu-
rons, it would be nice to confront the real systems more directly. In particular,
most neurons in the brain represent signals through trains of action potentials.
As noted in the introduction to this section, we’d like to make a direct measure-
ment of the information carried by these spikes or of the efficiency with which
the spikes represent the sensory world.
The first question we might ask is how much information we gain about the
sensory inputs by observing the occurrence of just one spike at some time t0
[71]. For simplicity let us imagine that the inputs are described just by one
function of time s(t), although this is not crucial; what will be crucial is that
we can repeat exactly the same time dependence many times, which for the
visual system means showing the same movie over and over again, so that we
can characterize the variability and reproducibility of the neural response. In
general, the information gained about s(t) by observing a set of neural responses
is
I =
∑
responses
∫
Ds(τ)P [s(τ) , resp] log2
(
P [s(τ) , resp]
P [s(τ)]P (resp)
)
,
(65)
where information is measured in bits. In the present case, the response is
a single spike, so summing over the full range of responses is equivalent to
integrating over the possible spike arrival times t0:
I1 spike =
∫
dt0
∫
Ds(τ)P [s(τ) , t0] log2
(
P [s(τ) , t0]
P [s(τ)]P [t0]
)
(66)
=
∫
dt0P [t0]
∫
Ds(τ)P [s(τ)|t0] log2
(
P [s(τ)|t0]
P [s(τ)]
)
,
(67)
where by P [s(τ)|t0] we mean the distribution of stimuli given that we have ob-
served a spike at time t0. In the absence of knowledge about the stimulus, all
spike arrival times are equally likely, and hence P [t0] is uniform. Furthermore,
we expect that the coding of stimuli is stationary in time, so that the condi-
tional distribution P [s(τ)|t0] is of the same shape for all t0, provided that we
measure the time dependence of the stimulus s(τ) relative to the spike time t0:
P [s(τ)|t0] = P [s(τ −∆t)|t0 −∆t]. With these simplifications we can write the
information conveyed by observing a single spike at time t0 as [50]
I1 spike =
∫
Ds(τ)P [s(τ)|t0 ] log2
(
P [s(τ)|t0]
P [s(τ)]
)
. (68)
In this formulation we think of the spike as ‘pointing to’ certain regions in the
space of possible stimuli, and of course the information conveyed is quantified
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by an integral that relates to the volume of these regions. The difficulty is
that if we want to use Eq. (68) in the analysis of real experiments we will
need a model of the distribution P [s(τ)|t0], and this could be hard to come
by: the stimuli are drawn from a space of very high dimensionality (a function
space, in principle) and so we cannot sample this distribution thoroughly in any
reasonable experiment. Thus computing information transmission by mapping
spikes back into the space of stimuli involves some model of how the code works,
and then this model is used to simplify the structure of the relevant distributions,
in this case P [s(τ)|t0]. We would like an alternative approach that does not
depend on such models.21
From Bayes’ rule we can relate the conditional probability of stimuli given
spikes to the conditional probability of spikes given stimuli:
P [s(τ)|t0]
P [s(τ)]
=
P [t0|s(τ)]
P [t0]
. (69)
But we can measure the probability of a spike at t0 given that we know the
stimulus s(τ) by repeating the stimulus many times and looking in a small bin
around t0 to measure the fraction of trials on which a spike occurred. If we
normalize by the size of the bin in which we look then we are measuring the
probability per unit time that a spike will be generated, which is a standard
way of averaging the response over many trials; the probability per unit time is
also called the time dependent firing rate r[t0; s(τ)], where the notation reminds
us that the probability of a spike at one time depends on the whole history of
inputs leading up to that time.
If we don’t know the stimulus then the probability of a spike at t0 can only
be given by the average firing rate over the whole experiment, r¯ = 〈r[t; s(τ)]〉,
where the expectation value 〈· · ·〉 denotes an average over the distribution of
stimuli P [s(τ)]. Thus we can write
P [s(τ)|t0]
P [s(τ)]
=
r[t0; s(τ)]
r¯
. (70)
Furthermore, we can substitute this relation into Eq. (68) for the information
carried by a single spike, and then we obtain
I1 spike =
〈(
r[t0; s(τ)]
r¯
)
log2
(
r[t0; s(τ)]
r¯
)〉
, (71)
We can compute the average in Eq. (71) by integrating over time, provided
that the stimulus we use runs for a sufficiently long time that it provides a
fair (ergodic) sampling of the true distribution P [s(τ)] from which stimuli are
drawn.
21I hope that it is clear where this could lead: If we can estimate information using a
model of what spikes stand for, and also estimate information without such a model, then
by comparing the two estimates we should be able to test our model of the code in the most
fundamental sense—does our model of what the neural response represents capture all of the
information that this response provides?
39
Explicitly, then, if we sample the ensemble of possible stimuli by choosing a
single time dependent stimulus s(t) that runs for a long duration T , and then
we repeat this stimulus many times to accumulate the time dependent firing
rate r[t; s(τ)], the information conveyed by a single spike is given exactly by an
average over this firing rate:
I1 spike =
1
T
∫ T
0
dt
(
r[t; s(τ)]
r¯
)
log2
(
r[t; s(τ)]
r¯
)
. (72)
This is an exact formula,independent of any model for the structure of the neural
code. It makes sense that the information carried by one spike should be related
to the firing rate, since the the rate vs. time gives a complete description of the
‘one body’ or one spike statistics of the spike train, in the same way that the
single particle density describes the one body statistics of a gas or liquid.
Problem 9: Poisson model and lower bounds. Prove that Eq. (72) provides
a lower bound to the information per spike transmitted if the entire spike train is a
modulated Poisson process [48].
Another view of the result in Eq. (72) is in terms of the distribution of times
at which a single spike might occur. First we note that the information a single
spike provides about the stimulus must be the same as the information that
knowledge of the stimulus provides about the occurrence time of a single spike—
information is mutual. Before we know the precise trajectory of the stimulus
s(t), all we can say is that if we are looking for one spike, it can occur anywhere in
our experimental window of size T , so that the probability is uniform, p0(t) =
1/T and the entropy of this distribution is just log2 T . Once we know the
stimulus, we can expect that spikes will occur preferentially at times where the
firing rate is large, so the probability distribution should be proportional to
r[t; s(τ)]; with proper normalization we have p1(t) = r[t; s(τ)]/(T r¯). Then the
conditional entropy is
S1 = −
∫ T
0
dtp1(t) log2 p1(t) (73)
= − 1
T
∫ T
0
dt
r[t; s(τ)]
r¯
log2
(
r[t; s(τ)]
r¯T
)
. (74)
The reduction in entropy is the gain in information, so
I1 spike = S0 − S1 (75)
=
1
T
∫ T
0
dt
(
r[t; s(τ)]
r¯
)
log2
(
r[t; s(τ)]
r¯
)
, (76)
as before.
A crucial point about Eq. (72) is that when we derive it we do not make use
of the fact that t0 is the time of a single spike: it could be any event that occurs
at a well defined time. There is considerable interest in the question of whether
‘synchronous’ spikes from two neurons provide special information in the neural
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code. If we define synchronous spikes as two spikes that occur within some fixed
(small) window of time then this compound event can also be given an arrival
time (e.g., the time of the later spike), and marking these arrival times across
repeated presentations of the same stimulus we can build up the rate rE [t; s(τ)]
for these events of class E in exactly the same way that we build up an estimate
of the spike rate. But if we have compound events constructed from two spikes,
it makes sense to compare the information carried by a single event IE with the
information that would be carried independently by two spikes, 2I1 spike. If the
compound event conveys more information than the sum of its parts, then this
compound event indeed is a special symbol in the code. The same arguments
apply to compound events constructed from temporal patterns of spikes in one
neuron.
If a compound event provides an amount of information exactly equal to
what we expect by adding up contributions from the components, then we say
that the components or elementary events convey information independently. If
there is less than independent information we say that the elementary events
are redundant, and if the compound event provides more than the sum of its
parts we say that there is synergy among the elementary events.
When we use these ideas to analyze Rob’s experiments on the fly’s H1 neuron
[71], we find that the occurrence of a single spike can provide from 1 to 2 bits of
information, depending on the details of the stimulus ensemble. More robustly
we find that pairs of spikes separated by less than 10 msec can provide more—
and sometimes vastly more—information than expected just by adding up the
contributions of the individual spikes. There is a small amount of redundancy
among spikes with larger separations, and if stimuli have a short correlation time
then spikes carry independent information once they are separated by more than
30 msec or so. It is interesting that this time scale for independent information
is close to the time scales of behavioral decisions, as if the fly waited long enough
to see all the spikes that have a chance of conveying information synergistically.
We’d like to understand what happens as all the spikes add up to give us
a fuller representation of the sensory signal: rather than thinking about the
information carried by particular events, we want to estimate the information
carried by long stretches of the neural response. Again the idea is straightfor-
ward [72, 73]: use Shannon’s definitions to write the mutual information between
stimuli and spikes in terms of difference between two entropies, and then use
a long experiment to sample the relevant distributions and thus estimate these
entropies. The difficulty is that when we talk not about single events but about
“long stretches of the neural response,” the number of possible responses is (ex-
ponentially) larger, and sampling is more difficult. Much of the effort in the
original papers thus is in convincing ourselves that we have control over these
sampling problems.
Let us look at segments of the spike train with length T , and within this
time we record the spike train with time resolution ∆τ ; these parameters are
somewhat arbitrary, and we will need to vary them to be be sure we understand
what is going on. In this view, however, the response is a “word” with K =
T/∆τ letters; for small ∆τ there can be only one or zero spikes in a bin and so
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the words are binary words, while for poorer time resolution we have a larger
alphabet. If we let the fly watch a long movie, many different words will be
produced and with a little luck we can get a good estimate of the probability
distribution of these words, P (W ). This distribution has an entropy
Stotal(T,∆τ) = −
∑
W
P (W ) log2 P (W ) (77)
which measures the size of the neuron’s vocabulary and hence the capacity of
the code given our parameters T and ∆τ [cf. Eq. (48) and the subsequent
discussion]. While a large vocabulary is a good thing, to convey information I
have to associate words with particular things in a reproducible way. Here we
can show the same movie many times, and if we look across the many trials at
a moment t relative to the start of the movie we again will see different words
(since there is some noise in the response), and these provide samples of the
distribution P (W |t). This distribution in turn has an entropy which we call
the noise entropy since any variation in response to the same inputs constitutes
noise in the representation of those inputs:22
Snoise =
〈
−
∑
W
P (W |t) log2 P (W |t)
〉
t
, (78)
where 〈· · ·〉 denotes an average over t and hence (by ergodicity) over the ensemble
of sensory inputs P [s]. Finally, the information that the neural response provides
about the sensory input is the difference between the total entropy and the noise
entropy,
I(T,∆τ) = Stotal(T,∆τ)− Snoise(T,∆τ), (79)
as in Eq. (46). A few points worth emphasizing:
• By using time averages in place of ensemble averages we can measure the
information that the response provides about the sensory input without
any explicit coordinate system on the space of inputs and hence with-
out making any assumptions about which features of the input are most
relevant.
• If we can sample the relevant distributions for sufficiently large times win-
dows T , we expect that entropy and information will become extensive
quantities, so that it makes sense to define entropy rates and information
rates.
• As we improve our time resolution, making ∆τ smaller, the capacity of
the code Stotal must increase, but it is an experimental question whether
the brain has the timing accuracy to make efficient use of this capacity.
22This is not to say that such variations might not provide information about something else,
but in the absence of some other signal against which we can correlate this ambiguity cannot
be resolved. It is good to keep in mind, however, that what we call noise could be signal,
while what we call signal really does constitute information about the input, independent of
any further hypotheses.
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The fly’s H1 neuron provides an ideal place to do all of this because of the
extreme stability of the preparation. In an effort to kill off any concerns about
sampling and statistics, Rob did a huge experiment with order one thousand
replays of the same long movie [72, 73]. With this large data set we were able
to see the onset of extensivity, so we extracted information and entropy rates
(although this really isn’t essential) and we were able to explore a wide range
of time resolutions, 800 > ∆τ > 2 ms. Note that ∆τ = 800 ms corresponds to
counting spikes in bins that contain typically thirty spikes, while ∆τ = 2 ms
corresponds to timing each spike to within 5% of the typical interspike interval.
Over this range, the entropy of the spike train varies over a factor of roughly
40, illustrating the increasing capacity of the system to convey information
by making use of spike timing. The information that the spike train conveys
about the visual stimulus increases in approximate proportion to the entropy,
corresponding to ∼ 50% efficiency, although we start to see some saturation
of information at the very highest time resolutions. Interestingly, this level
of efficiency (and its approximate constancy as a function of time resolution)
confirms an earlier measurement of efficiency in mechanosensor neurons from
frogs and crickets that used the ideas of decoding discussed in the previous
section [74].
What have we learned from this? First of all, the earliest experiments on
neural coding showed that the rate of spiking encodes stimulus amplitude for
static stimuli, but this left open the question of whether the precise timing of
spikes carries additional information. The first application of information theory
to neurons (as far as I know) was MacKay and McCulloch’s calculation of the
capacity of neurons to carry information given different assumptions about the
nature of the code [75], and of course they drew attention to the fact that
the capacity increases as we allow fine temporal details of the spike sequence
to become distinguishable symbols in the code. Even MacKay and McCulloch
were skeptical about whether real neurons could use a significant fraction of
their capacity, however, and other investigators were more than skeptical. The
debate about whether spike timing is important raged on, and I think that one
of the important contributions of an information theoretic approach has been
to make precise what we might mean by ‘timing is important.’
There are two senses in which the timing of action potentials could be impor-
tant to the neural code. First there is the simple question of whether marking
spike arrival times to higher resolution really allows us to extract more infor-
mation about the sensory inputs. We know (following MacKay and McCulloch)
that if we use higher time resolution the entropy of the spike train increases,
and hence the capacity to transmit information also increases. The question is
whether this capacity is used, and the answer (for one neuron, under one set of
conditions ... ) is in Ref. [73]: yes, unambiguously.
A second notion of spike timing being important is that temporal patterns
of spikes may carry more information than would be expected by adding the
contributions of single spikes. Again the usual setting for this sort of code is in a
population of neurons, but the question is equally well posed for patterns across
time in a single cell. Another way of asking the question is whether the high
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information rates observed for the spike train as a whole are “just” a reflection
of rapid, large amplitude modulations in the spike rate.23 Equation 72 makes
clear that “information carried by rate modulations” is really the information
carried by single spikes. The results of Ref. [71] show that pairs of spikes can
carry more than twice the single spike information, and the analysis of longer
windows of responses shows that this synergy is maintained, so that the spike
train as a whole is carrying 30–50%more information than expected by summing
the contributions of single spikes. Thus the answer to the question of whether
temporal patterns are important, or whether there is “more than just rate” is
again: yes, unambiguously.
These results on coding efficiency and synergy are surprisingly robust [76]:
If we analyze the responses of H1 neurons from many different flies, all watching
the same movie, it is easy to see that the flies are very different—average spike
rates can vary by a factor of three among individuals, and by looking at the
details of how each fly associates stimuli and responses we can distinguish a
typical pair of flies from just 30msec of data. On the other hand, if we look
at the coding efficiency—the information divided by the total entropy—this is
constant to within 10% across the population of flies in our experiments, and
this high efficiency always has a significant contribution from synergy beyond
single spikes.
The direct demonstration that the neural code is efficient in this information
theoretic sense clearly depends on using complex, dynamic sensory inputs rather
than the traditional quasistatic signals. We turned to these dynamic inputs not
because they are challenging to analyze but rather because we thought that they
would provide a better model for the problems encountered by the brain under
natural conditions. This has become part of a larger effort in the community
to analyze the way in which the nervous system deals with natural signals,
and it probably is fair to point out that this effort has not been without its
share of controversies [77]. One way to settle the issue is to strive for ever more
natural experimental conditions. I think that Rob’s recent experiments hold the
record for ‘naturalness’: rather than showing movies in the lab, he has taken his
whole experiment outside into the woods where the flies are caught and recorded
from H1 while rotating the fly through angular trajectories like those observed
for freely flying flies [78]. This is an experimental tour de force (I can say this
without embarrassment since I’m a theorist) because you have to maintain stable
electrical recordings of neural activity while the sample is spinning at thousands
of degrees per second and and accelerating to reverse direction within 10 msec.
The reward is that spike timing is even more reproducible in the “wild” than in
the lab, coding efficiencies and information rates are higher and are maintained
to even smaller values ∆τ .
All of the results above point to the idea that spike trains really do provide an
efficient representation of the sensory world, at least in one precise information
theoretic sense. Many experimental groups are exploring whether similar results
23Note that in many cases this formulation obscures the fact that the a single “large ampli-
tude modulation” is a bump in the firing rate with area of order one, so what might be called
a large rate change is really one spike.
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can be obtained in other systems, in effect asking if these theoretically appealing
features of the code are universal. Here I want to look at a different question,
namely whether this efficient code is fixed in the nervous system or whether
it adapts and develops in response to the surroundings. The ideas and results
that we have on these issues are, I think, some of the clearest evidence available
for optimization in the neural code. Once again all the experiments are done in
Rob de Ruyter’s lab using H1 as the test case, and most of what we currently
know is from work by Naama Brenner and Adrienne Fairhall [79, 80].
There are two reasons to suspect that the efficiency we have measured is
achieved through adaptation rather than through hard wiring. First, one might
guess that a fixed coding scheme could be so efficient and informative only if we
choose the right ensemble of inputs, and you have to trust me that we didn’t
search around among many ensembles to find the results that I quoted. Second,
under natural conditions the signals we want to encode are intermittent—the
fly may fly straight, so that typical angular velocities are ∼ 50◦/sec, or may
launch into acrobatics where typical velocities are ∼ 2000◦/sec, and there are
possibilities in between. At a much simpler level, if we look across a natural
scene, we find regions where the variance of light intensity or contrast is small,
and nearby regions in which it is large [81]. Observations on contrast variance
in natural images led to the suggestion that neurons in the retina might adapt
in real time to this variance, and this was confirmed [82]. Here we would like
to look at the parallel issue for velocity signals in the fly’s motions sensitive
neurons.
In a way what we are looking for is really contained in Laughlin’s model
problem discussed above. Suppose that we could measure the strategy that
the fly actually uses for converting continuous signals into spikes; we could
characterize this by giving the probability that a spike will be generated at t
given the signal s(τ < t), which is what we have called the firing rate r[t; s(τ)].
We are hoping that the neuron sets this coding strategy using some sort of
optimization principle, although it is perhaps not so clear what constraints are
relevant once we move from the model problem to the real neurons. On the other
hand, we can say something about the nature of such optimization problems if
we think about scaling: when we plot r[s], what sets the scale along the s axis?
We know from the previous section that there is a limit to the smallest
motion signals that can be reliably estimated, and of course there is a limit to
the highest velocities that the system can deal with (if you move sufficiently fast
everything blurs and vision is impossible). Happily, most of the signals we (and
the fly) deal with are well away from these limits, which are themselves rather
far apart. But this means that there is nothing intrinsic to the system which
sets the scale for measuring angular velocity and encoding it in spikes, so if r[s]
is to emerge as the solution to an optimization problem then the scale along
the s axis must be determined by outside world, that is by the distribution
P [s] from which the signals are drawn. Further, if we scale the distribution
of inputs, P [s] → λP [λs] then the optimal coding strategy also should scale,
45
r[s] → r[λs].24 The prediction, then, is that if the system can optimize its
coding strategy in relation to the statistical structure of the sensory world, then
we should be able to draw signals from a family of scaled distributions and
see the input/output relations of the neurons scale in proportion to the input
dynamic range. To make a long story short, this is exactly what we saw in H1
[79].25
The observation of scaling behavior is such a complex system certainly warms
the hearts of physicists who grew up in a certain era. But Naama realized that
one could do more. The observation of scaling tells us (experimentally!) that the
system has a choice among a one parameter family of input/output relations,
and so we can ask why the system chooses the one that it does. The answer is
striking: the exact scale factor chosen by the system is the one that maximizes
information transmission.
If the neural code is adapting in response to changes of the input distribution,
and further if this adaptation serves to maximize information transmission, then
we should be able to make sudden a change between two very different input
distributions and “catch” the system using the wrong code and hence transmit-
ting less than the maximum possible information. As the system collects enough
data to be sure that the distribution has changed, the code should adapt and
information transmission should recover. As with the simpler measurements of
information transmission in steady state, the idea here is simple enough but
finding an experimental design that actually gives enough data to avoid all sta-
tistical problems is a real challenge, and this is what Adrienne did in Ref. [80].
The result is clear: when we switch from one P [s] to another we can detect the
drop in efficiency of information transmission associated with the use of the old
code in the new distribution, and we can measure the time course of information
recovery as the code adapts. What surprised us (although it shouldn’t have) was
the speed of this recovery, which can be complete in much less than 100 msec.
In fact, for the conditions of these experiments, we can actually calculate how
rapidly an optimal processor could make a reliable decision about the change
in distribution, and when the dust settles the answer is that the dynamics of
24I’m being a little sloppy here: s is really a function of time, not just a single number, but
I hope the idea is clear.
25There is one technical issue in the analysis of Ref. [79] that I think is of broader theoretical
interest. In trying to characterize the input/output relation r[t; s(τ)] we face the problem that
the inputs s(τ) really live in a function space, or in more down to earth terms a space of very
large dimensionality. Clearly we can’t just plot the function r[t; s(τ)] in this space. Further,
our intuition is that neurons are not equally sensitive to all of the dimensions or features of
their inputs. To make progress (and in fact to get the scaling results) we have to make this
intuition precise and find the relevant dimensions in stimulus space; along the way it would
be nice to provide some direct evidence that the number of dimensions is actually small (!).
If we are willing to consider Gaussian P [s(τ)], then we can show that by computing the right
correlation functions between s(τ) and the stream of spikes ρ(t) =
∑
i
δ(t − ti) we can both
count the number of relevant dimensions and provide an explicit coordinate system on the
relevant subspace [59, 79]. These techniques are now being used to analyze other systems as
well, and we are trying to understand if we can make explicit use of information theoretic
tools to move beyond the analysis of Gaussian inputs and low order correlation functions. I
find the geometrical picture of neurons as selective for a small number of dimensions rather
attractive as well being useful, but it is a bit off the point of this discussion.
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the adaptation that we see in the fly are running within a factor of two of the
maximum speed set by these limits to statistical inference.26
I have the feeling that my presentation of these ideas mirrors their devel-
opment. It took us a long time to build up the tools that bring information
theory and optimization principles into contact with real experiments on the
neural coding of complex, dynamic signals. Once we have the tools, however,
the results are clear, at least for this one system where we (or, more precisely,
Rob) can do almost any experiment we want:
• Spike trains convey information about natural input signals with ∼ 50%
efficiency down to millisecond time resolution.
• This efficiency is enhanced significantly by synergistic coding in which
temporal patterns of spikes stand for more than the sum of their parts.
• Although the detailed structure of the neural code is highly individualized,
these basic features are strikingly constant across individuals.
• Coding efficiency and information rates are higher under more natural
conditions.
• The observed information transmission rates are the result of an adaptive
coding scheme which takes a simple scaling form in response to changes
in the dynamic range of the inputs.
• The precise choice of scale by the real code is the one which maximizes
information transmission.
• The dynamics of this adaptation process are almost as fast as possible
given the need to collect statistical evidence for changes in the input dis-
tribution.
I think it is fair to say that this body of work provides very strong evidence
in support of information theoretic optimization as a “design principle” within
which we can understand the phenomenology of the neural code.
5 Learning and complexity
The world around us, thankfully, is a rather structured place. Whether we are
doing a careful experiment in the laboratory or are gathering sense data on a
walk through the woods, the signals that arrive at our brains are far from random
noise; there appear to be some underlying regularities or rules. Surely one task
26Again there is more to these experiments than what I have emphasized here. The process
of adaptation in fact has multiple time scales, ranging from tens of milliseconds out to many
minutes. These rich dynamics offer possibilities for longer term statistical properties of the
spike train to resolve the ambiguities (how does the fly know the absolute scale of velocity
if it is scaled away?) that arise in any adaptive coding scheme. The result is that while
information about the scaled stimulus recovers quickly during the process of adaptation, some
information about the scale itself is preserved and can be read out by simple algorithms.
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our brain must face is the learning or extraction of these rules and regularities.
Perhaps the simplest example of learning a rule is fitting a function to data—we
believe in advance that the rule belongs to a class of possible rules that can be
parameterized, and as we collect data we learn the values of the parameters.
This simple example introduces us to many deep issues:
• If there is noise in the data then really we are trying to learn a probability
distribution, not just a functional relation.
• We would like to compare models (classes of possible rules) that have dif-
ferent numbers of parameters, and incorporate the intuition that ‘simpler’
models are better.
• We might like to step outside the restrictions of finite parameterization
and consider the possibility that the data are described by functions that
are merely ‘smooth’ to some degree.
• We would like to quantify how much we are learning (or how much can be
learned) about the underlying rules.
In the last decade or so, a rich literature has emerged, tackling these problems
with a sophistication far beyond the curve fitting exercises that we all performed
in our student physics laboratories. I will try to take a path through these devel-
opments, emphasizing the connections of these learning problems to problems
in statistical mechanics and the implications of this statistical approach for an
information theoretic characterization of how much we learn. Most of what I
have to say on this subject is drawn from collaborations with Ilya Nemenman
and Tali Tishby [83, 84, 85]; in particular the first of these papers is long and
has lots of references to more standard things which I will outline here without
attribution.
Let’s just plunge in with the classic example: We observe two streams of
data x and y, or equivalently a stream of pairs (x1, y1), (x2, y2), · · · , (xN, yN).
Assume that we know in advance that the x’s are drawn independently and
at random from a distribution P (x), while the y’s are noisy versions of some
function acting on x,
yn = f(xn;α) + ηn, (80)
where f(x;α) is one function from a class of functions parameterized by α ≡
{α1, α2, · · · , αK} and ηn is noise, which for simplicity we will assume is Gaussian
with known standard deviation σ. We can even start with a very simple case,
where the function class is just a linear combination of basis functions, so that
f(x;α) =
K∑
µ=1
αµφµ(x). (81)
The usual problem is to estimate, from N pairs {xi, yi}, the values of the pa-
rameters α; in favorable cases such as this we might even be able to find an
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effective regression formula. Probably you were taught that the way to do this
is to compute χ2,
χ2 =
∑
n
[yn − f(xn;α)]2, (82)
and then minimize to find the correct parameters α. You may or may not have
been taught why this is the right thing to do.
With the model described above, the probability that we will observe the
pairs {xi, yi} can be written as
P ({xi, yi}|α) = exp
[
−N
2
ln(2πσ2)− χ
2
2σ2
]∏
n
P (xn), (83)
assuming that we know the parameters. Thus finding parameters which mini-
mize χ2 also serves to maximize the probability that our model could have given
rise to the data. But why is this a good idea?
We recall that the entropy is the expectation value of − logP , and that it
is possible to encode signals so that the amount of “space” required to specify
each signal uniquely is on average equal to the entropy.27 With a little more
work one can show that each possible signal s drawn from P (s) can be encoded
in a space of − log2 P (s) bits. Now any model probability distribution implicitly
defines a scheme for coding signals that are drawn from that distribution, so
if we make sure that our data have high probability in the distribution (small
values of − logP ) then we also are making sure that our code or representation
of these data is compact. What this means is that good old fashioned curve
fitting really is all about finding efficient representations of data, precisely the
principle enunciated by Barlow for the operation of the nervous system (!).
If we follow this notion of efficient representation a little further we can do
better than just maximizing χ2. The claim that a model provides a code for the
data is not complete, because at some point I have to represent my knowledge
of the model itself. One idea is to do this explicitly—estimate how accurately
you know each of the parameters, and then count how many bits you’ll need to
write down the parameters to that accuracy and add this to the length of your
code; this is the point of view taken by Risannen and others in a set of ideas
called “minimum description length” or MDL. Another idea is more implicit—
the truth is that I don’t really know the parameters, all I do is estimate them
from the data, so it’s not so obvious that I should separate coding the data
from coding the parameters (although this might emerge as an approximation).
In this view what we should do is to integrate over all possible values of the
parameters, weighted by some prior knowledge (maybe just that the parameters
27This is obvious for uniform probability distributions with 2n alternatives, since then the
binary number representing each alternative is this code we want. For nonuniform distribu-
tions we need to think about writing things down many times and taking an average of the
space we use each time, and the fact that the answer comes out the same (as the entropy)
hinges on the “typicality” of such data streams, which is the information theorist’s way of
talking about the equivalence of canonical and microcanonical ensembles.
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are bounded), and thus compute the probability that our data could have arisen
from the class of models we are considering.
To carry out this program of computing the total probability of the data
given the model class we need to do the integral
P ({xi, yi}|class) =
∫
dKαP (α)P [{xi, yi}|α] (84)
=
[∏
n
P (xn)
]
×
∫
dKαP (α) exp
[
−N
2
ln(2πσ2)− χ
2
2σ2
]
. (85)
But remember that χ2 as we have defined it is a sum over data points, which
means we expect it (typically) will be proportional to N . This means that at
largeN we are doing an integral in which the exponential has terms proportional
to N—and so we should use a saddle point approximation. The saddle point
of course is close to the place where χ2 is minimized, and then we do the usual
Gaussian (one loop) integral around this point; actually if we stick with the
simplest case of Eq. (81) then this Gaussian approximation becomes exact.
When the dust settles we find
− lnP ({xi, yi}|class) = −
∑
n
lnP (xn) +
χ2min
2σ2
+
K
2
lnN + · · · , (86)
and we recall that this measures the length of the shortest code for {xi, yi} that
can be generated given the class of models. The first term averages to N times
the entropy of the distribution P (x), which makes sense since by hypothesis
the x’s are being chosen at random. The second term is as before, essentially
the length of the code required to describe the deviations of the data from the
predictions of the best fit model; this also grows in proportion to N . The third
term must be related to coding our knowledge of the model itself, since it is
proportional to the number of parameters. We can understand the (1/2) lnN
because each parameter is determined to an accuracy of ∼ 1/
√
N , so if we start
with a parameter space of size ∼ 1 there is a reduction in volume by a factor
of
√
N and hence a decrease in entropy (gain in information) by (1/2) lnN .
Finally, the terms · · · don’t grow with N .
What is crucial about the term (K/2) lnN is that it depends explicitly on
the number of parameters. In general we expect that by considering models with
more parameters we can get a better fit to the data, which means that χ2 can
be reduced by considering more complex model classes. But we know intuitively
that this has to stop—we don’t want to use arbitrarily complex models, even if
they do provide a good fit to what we have seen. It is attractive, then, that if we
look for the shortest code which can be generated by a class of models, there is
an implicit penalty or coding cost for increased complexity. It is interesting from
a physicist’s point of view that this term emerges essentially from consideration
of phase space or volumes in model space. It thus is an entropy–like quantity in
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its own right, and the selection of the best model class could be thought of as
a tradeoff between this entropy and the “energy” measured by χ2. If we keep
going down this line of thought we can imagine a thermodynamic limit with
large numbers of parameters and data points, and there can be “aha!” types of
phase transitions from poor fits to good fits as we increase the ratio N/K [86].
The reason we need to control the complexity of our models is because
the real problem of learning is neither the estimation of parameters nor the
compact representation of the data we have already seen. The real problem
of learning is generalization: we want to extract the rules underlying what we
have seen because we believe that these rules will continue to be true and hence
will describe the relationships among data that we will observe in the future.
Our experience is that overly complex models might provide a more accurate
description of what we have seen so far but do a bad job at predicting what we
will see next. This suggests that there are connections between predictability
and complexity.
There is in fact a completely different motivation for quantifying complexity,
and this is to make precise an impression that some systems, such as life on earth
or a turbulent fluid flow, evolve toward a state of higher complexity; one might
even like to classify these states. These problems traditionally are in the realm
of dynamical systems theory and statistical physics. A central difficulty in this
effort is to distinguish complexity from randomness—trajectories of dynamical
systems can be regular, which we take to mean “simple” in the intuitive sense,
or chaotic, but what we mean by complex is somewhere in between. The field
of complexology (as Magnasco likes to call it) is filled with multiple definitions
of complexity and confusing remarks about what they all might mean. In this
noisy environment, there is a wonderful old paper by Grassberger [87] which
gives a clear signal: Systems with regular or chaotic/random dynamics share
the property that the entropy of sample trajectories is almost exactly extensive
in the length of the trajectory, while for systems that we identify intuitively
as being complex there are large corrections to extensivity which can even di-
verge as we take longer and longer samples. In the end Grassberger suggested
that these subextensive terms in the entropy really do quantify our intuitive
notions of complexity, although he made this argument by example rather than
axiomatically.
We can connect the measures of complexity that arise in learning problems
with those that arise in dynamical systems by noticing that the subextensive
components of entropy identified by Grassberger in fact determine the informa-
tion available for making predictions.28 This also suggests a connection to the
importance or value of information, especially in a biological or economic con-
text: information is valuable if it can be used to guide our actions, but actions
take time and hence observed data can be useful only to the extent that those
data inform us about the state of the world at later times. It would be attrac-
tive if what we identify as “complex” in a time series were also the “useful” or
28The text of the discussion here follows Ref. [84] rather closely, and I thank my colleagues
for permission to include it here.
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“meaningful” components.
While prediction may come in various forms, depending on context, infor-
mation theory allows us to treat all of them on the same footing. For this
we only need to recognize that all predictions are probabilistic, and that, even
before we look at the data, we know that certain futures are more likely than
others. This knowledge can be summarized by a prior probability distribution
for the futures. Our observations on the past lead us to a new, more tightly con-
centrated distribution, the distribution of futures conditional on the past data.
Different kinds of predictions are different slices through or averages over this
conditional distribution, but information theory quantifies the “concentration”
of the distribution without making any commitment as to which averages will
be most interesting.
Imagine that we observe a stream of data x(t) over a time interval −T <
t < 0; let all of these past data be denoted by the shorthand xpast. We are
interested in saying something about the future, so we want to know about the
data x(t) that will be observed in the time interval 0 < t < T ′; let these future
data be called xfuture. In the absence of any other knowledge, futures are drawn
from the probability distribution P (xfuture), while observations of particular past
data xpast tell us that futures will be drawn from the conditional distribution
P (xfuture|xpast). The greater concentration of the conditional distribution can
be quantified by the fact that it has smaller entropy than the prior distribution,
and this reduction in entropy is the information that the past provides about
the future. We can write the average of this predictive information as
Ipred(T, T ′) =
〈
log2
[
P (xfuture|xpast)
P (xfuture)
]〉
(87)
= −〈log2 P (xfuture)〉 − 〈log2 P (xpast)〉
− [−〈log2 P (xfuture, xpast)〉] , (88)
where 〈· · ·〉 denotes an average over the joint distribution of the past and the
future, P (xfuture, xpast).
Each of the terms in Eq. (88) is an entropy. Since we are interested in
predictability or generalization, which are associated with some features of the
signal persisting forever, we may assume stationarity or invariance under time
translations. Then the entropy of the past data depends only on the duration
of our observations, so we can write −〈log2 P (xpast)〉 = S(T ), and by the same
argument −〈log2 P (xfuture)〉 = S(T ′). Finally, the entropy of the past and the
future taken together is the entropy of observations on a window of duration
T + T ′, so that −〈log2 P (xfuture, xpast)〉 = S(T + T ′). Putting these equations
together, we obtain
Ipred(T, T ′) = S(T ) + S(T ′)− S(T + T ′). (89)
In the same way that the entropy of a gas at fixed density is proportional to
the volume, the entropy of a time series (asymptotically) is proportional to its
duration, so that limT→∞ S(T )/T = S0; entropy is an extensive quantity. But
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from Eq. (89) any extensive component of the entropy cancels in the computa-
tion of the predictive information: predictability is a deviation from extensivity.
If we write
S(T ) = S0T + S1(T ) , (90)
then Eq. (89) tells us that the predictive information is related only to the
nonextensive term S1(T ).
We know two general facts about the behavior of S1(T ). First, the correc-
tions to extensive behavior are positive, S1(T ) ≥ 0. Second, the statement that
entropy is extensive is the statement that the limit
lim
T→∞
S(T )/T = S0 (91)
exists, and for this to be true we must also have limT→∞ S1(T )/T = 0. Thus the
nonextensive terms in the entropy must be subextensive, that is they must grow
with T less rapidly than a linear function. Taken together, these facts guarantee
that the predictive information is positive and subextensive. Further, if we let
the future extend forward for a very long time, T ′ → ∞, then we can measure
the information that our sample provides about the entire future,
Ipred(T ) = lim
T ′→∞
Ipred(T, T ′) = S1(T ) , (92)
and this is precisely equal to the subextensive entropy.
If we have been observing a time series for a (long) time T , then the total
amount of data we have collected in is measured by the entropy S(T ), and at
large T this is given approximately by S0T . But the predictive information
that we have gathered cannot grow linearly with time, even if we are making
predictions about a future which stretches out to infinity. As a result, of the
total information we have taken in by observing xpast, only a vanishing fraction
is of relevance to the prediction:
lim
T→∞
Predictive Information
Total Information
=
Ipred(T )
S(T )
→ 0. (93)
In this precise sense, most of what we observe is irrelevant to the problem of
predicting the future.
Consider the case where time is measured in discrete steps, so that we have
seen N time points x1, x2, · · · , xN . How much is there to learn about the un-
derlying pattern in these data? In the limit of large number of observations,
N → ∞ or T → ∞, the answer to this question is surprisingly universal: pre-
dictive information may either stay finite, or grow to infinity together with T ;
in the latter case the rate of growth may be slow (logarithmic) or fast (sublinear
power).
The first possibility, limT→∞ Ipred(T ) = constant, means that no matter
how long we observe we gain only a finite amount of information about the
future. This situation prevails, in both extreme cases mentioned above. For
example, when the dynamics are very regular, as for a purely periodic system,
53
complete prediction is possible once we know the phase, and if we sample the
data at discrete times this is a finite amount of information; longer period orbits
intuitively are more complex and also have larger Ipred, but this doesn’t change
the limiting behavior limT→∞ Ipred(T ) = constant.
Similarly, the predictive information can be small when the dynamics are
irregular but the best predictions are controlled only by the immediate past, so
that the correlation times of the observable data are finite. This happens, for
example, in many physical systems far away from phase transitions. Imagine,
for example, that we observe x(t) at a series of discrete times {tn}, and that
at each time point we find the value xn. Then we always can write the joint
distribution of the N data points as a product,
P (x1, x2, · · · , xN ) = P (x1)P (x2|x1)P (x3|x2, x1) · · · . (94)
For Markov processes, what we observe at tn depends only on events at the
previous time step tn−1, so that
P (xn|{x1≤i≤n−1}) = P (xn|xn−1), (95)
and hence the predictive information reduces to
Ipred =
〈
log2
[
P (xn|xn−1)
P (xn)
]〉
. (96)
The maximum possible predictive information in this case is the entropy of the
distribution of states at one time step, which in turn is bounded by the logarithm
of the number of accessible states. To approach this bound the system must
maintain memory for a long time, since the predictive information is reduced
by the entropy of the transition probabilities. Thus systems with more states
and longer memories have larger values of Ipred.
Problem 10: Brownian motion of a spring. Consider the Brownian motion of an
overdamped particle bound a spring. The Langevin equation describing the particle
position x(t) is
γ
dx(t)
dt
+ κx(t) = Fext(t) + δF (t), (97)
where γ is the damping constant, κ is the stiffness of the spring, Fext(t) is an ex-
ternal force that might be applied to the particle, and δF (t) is the Langevin force.
The Langevin force is random, with Gaussian statistics and white noise correlation
properties,
〈δF (t)δF (t′)〉 = 2γkBTδ(t− t
′). (98)
Show that the correlation function has a simple exponential form,
〈x(t)x(t′)〉 = 〈x2〉 exp(−|t− t′|/τc), (99)
and evaluate the correlation time. Now take the original Langevin equation and form
a discrete version, introducing a small time step ∆t; be sure that your discretization
preserves exactly the observable variance 〈x2〉. You should be able to find a natural
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discretization in which the evolution of x is Markovian, and then you can compute
the predictive information for the time series x(t). How does this result depend on
temperature? Why? Express the dependence on ∆t in units of the correlation time
τc. Is there a well defined limit as ∆t→ 0? Again, why (or why not)?
More interesting are those cases in which Ipred(T ) diverges at large T . In
physical systems we know that there are critical points where correlation times
become infinite, so that optimal predictions will be influenced by events in the
arbitrarily distant past. Under these conditions the predictive information can
grow without bound as T becomes large; for many systems the divergence is
logarithmic, Ipred(T →∞) ∝ logT .
Long range correlation also are important in a time series where we can
learn some underlying rules, as in the discussion of curve fitting that started
this section. Since we saw that curve fitting with noisy data really involves a
probabilistic model, let us talk explicitly about the more general problem of
learning distributions. Suppose a series of random vector variables {~xi} are
drawn independently from the same probability distribution Q(~x|α), and this
distribution depends on a (potentially infinite dimensional) vector of parameters
α. The parameters are unknown, and before the series starts they are chosen
randomly from a distribution P(α). In this setting, at least implicitly, our
observations of {~xi} provide data from which we can learn the parameters α.
Here we put aside (for the moment) the usual problem of learning—which might
involve constructing some estimation or regression scheme that determines a
“best fit” α from the data {~xi}—and treat the ensemble of data streams P [{~xi}]
as we would any other set of configurations in statistical mechanics or dynamical
systems theory. In particular, we can compute the entropy of the distribution
P [{~xi}] even if we can’t provide explicit algorithms for solving the learning
problem.
As shown in [83], the crucial quantity in such analysis is the density of
models in the vicinity of the target α¯—the parameters that actually generated
the sequence. For two distributions, a natural distance measure is the Kullback–
Leibler divergence,
DKL(α¯||α) =
∫
d~xQ(~x|α¯) log
[
Q(~x|α¯)
Q(~x|α)
]
, (100)
and the density is
ρ(D; α¯) =
∫
dKαP(α)δ[D −DKL(α¯||α)]. (101)
If ρ is large as D → 0, then one easily can get close to the target for many
different data; thus they are not very informative. On the other hand, small
density means that only very particular data lead to α¯, so they carry a lot of
predictive information. Therefore, it is clear that the density, but not the num-
ber of parameters or any other simplistic measure, characterizes predictability
and the complexity of prediction. If, as often is the case for dimα < ∞, the
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density behaves in the way common to finite dimensional systems of the usual
statistical mechanics,
ρ(D → 0, α¯) ≈ AD(K−2)/2 , (102)
then the predictive information to the leading order is
Ipred(N) ≈ K
2
logN . (103)
The modern theory of learning is concerned in large part with quantifying
the complexity of a model class, and in particular with replacing a simple count
of parameters with a more rigorous notion of dimensionality for the space of
models; for a general review of these ideas see Ref. [88], and for a discussion
close in spirit to this one see Ref. [89]. The important point here is that the
dimensionality of the model class, and hence the complexity of the class in the
sense of learning theory, emerges as the coefficient of the logarithmic divergence
in Ipred. Thus a measure of complexity in learning problems can be derived from
a more general dynamical systems or statistical mechanics point of view, treating
the data in the learning problem as a time series or one dimensional lattice. The
logarithmic complexity class that we identify as being associated with finite
dimensional models also arises, for example, at the Feigenbaum accumulation
point in the period doubling route to chaos [87].
As noted by Grassberger in his original discussion, there are time series for
which the divergence of Ipred is stronger than a logarithm. We can construct
an example by looking at the density function ρ in our learning problem above:
finite dimensional models are associated with algebraic decay of the density as
D → 0, and we can imagine that there are model classes in which this decay is
more rapid, for example
ρ(D → 0) ≈ A exp [−B/Dµ] , µ > 0 . (104)
In this case it can be shown that the predictive information diverges very rapidly,
as a sublinear power law,
Ipred(N) ∼ Nµ/(µ+1) . (105)
One way that this scenario can arise is if the distribution Q(~x) that we are
trying to learn does not belong to any finite parameter family, but is itself drawn
from a distribution that enforces a degree of smoothness [90]. Understandably,
stronger smoothness constraints have smaller powers (less to predict) than the
weaker ones (more to predict). For example, a rather simple case of predicting
a one dimensional variable that comes from a continuous distribution produces
Ipred(N) ∼
√
N .
As with the logarithmic class, we expect that power–law divergences in
Ipred are not restricted to the learning problems that we have studied in de-
tail. The general point is that such behavior will be seen in problems where
predictability over long scales, rather then being controlled by a fixed set of
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ever more precisely known parameters, is governed by a progressively more de-
tailed description—effectively increasing the number of parameters—as we col-
lect more data. This seems a plausible description of what happens in language,
where rules of spelling allow us to predict forthcoming letters of long words,
grammar binds the words together, and compositional unity of the entire text
allows predictions about the subject of the last page of the book after reading
only the first few. Indeed, Shannon’s classic experiment on the predictability
of English text (by human readers!) shows this behavior [91, 92], and more re-
cently several groups have extracted power–law subextensive components from
the numerical analysis of large corpora of text.
Interestingly, even without an explicit example, a simple argument ensures
existence of exponential densities and, therefore, power law predictive informa-
tion models. If the number of parameters in a learning problem is not finite then
in principle it is impossible to predict anything unless there is some appropriate
regularization. If we let the number of parameters stay finite but become large,
then there is more to be learned and correspondingly the predictive informa-
tion grows in proportion to this number. On the other hand, if the number of
parameters becomes infinite without regularization, then the predictive infor-
mation should go to zero since nothing can be learned. We should be able to see
this happen in a regularized problem as the regularization weakens: eventually
the regularization would be insufficient and the predictive information would
vanish. The only way this can happen is if the predictive information grows
more and more rapidly with N as we weaken the regularization, until finally it
becomes extensive (equivalently, drops to zero) at the point where prediction
becomes impossible. To realize this scenario we have to go beyond Ipred ∝ logT
with Ipred ∝ Nµ/(µ+1); the transition from increasing predictive information to
zero occurs as µ→ 1.
This discussion makes it clear that the predictive information (the subexten-
sive entropy) distinguishes between problems of intuitively different complexity
and thus, in accord to Grassberger’s definitions [87], is probably a good choice
for a universal complexity measure. Can this intuition be made more precise?
First we need to decide whether we want to attach measures of complexity
to a particular signal x(t) or whether we are interested in measures that are
defined by an average over the ensemble P [x(t)]. One problem in assigning
complexity to single realizations is that there can be atypical data streams.
Second, Grassberger [87] in particular has argued that our visual intuition about
the complexity of spatial patterns is an ensemble concept, even if the ensemble
is only implicit. The fact that we admit probabilistic models is crucial: even
at a colloquial level, if we allow for probabilistic models then there is a simple
description for a sequence of truly random bits, but if we insist on a deterministic
model then it may be very complicated to generate precisely the observed string
of bits. Furthermore, in the context of probabilistic models it hardly makes sense
to ask for a dynamics that generates a particular data stream; we must ask for
dynamics that generate the data with reasonable probability, which is more
or less equivalent to asking that the given string be a typical member of the
ensemble generated by the model. All of these paths lead us to thinking not
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about single strings but about ensembles in the tradition of statistical mechanics,
and so we shall search for measures of complexity that are averages over the
distribution P [x(t)].
Once we focus on average quantities, we can provide an axiomatic proof
(much in the spirit of Shannon’s [63] arguments establishing entropy as a unique
information measure) that links Ipred to complexity. We can start by adopting
Shannon’s postulates as constraints on a measure of complexity: if there are N
equally likely signals, then the measure should be monotonic in N ; if the signal
is decomposable into statistically independent parts then the measure should be
additive with respect to this decomposition; and if the signal can be described
as a leaf on a tree of statistically independent decisions then the measure should
be a weighted sum of the measures at each branching point. We believe that
these constraints are as plausible for complexity measures as for information
measures, and it is well known from Shannon’s original work that this set of
constraints leaves the entropy as the only possibility. Since we are discussing
a time dependent signal, this entropy depends on the duration of our sample,
S(T ). We know of course that this cannot be the end of the discussion, because
we need to distinguish between randomness (entropy) and complexity. The path
to this distinction is to introduce other constraints on our measure.
First we notice that if the signal x is continuous, then the entropy is not
invariant under transformations of x, even if these reparamterizations do not
mix points at different times. It seems reasonable to ask that complexity be a
function of the process we are observing and not of the coordinate system in
which we choose to record our observations. However, it is not the whole func-
tion S(T ) which depends on the coordinate system for x; it is only the extensive
component of the entropy that has this noninvariance. This can be seen more
generally by noting that subextensive terms in the entropy contribute to the
mutual information among different segments of the data stream (including the
predictive information defined here), while the extensive entropy cannot; mutual
information is coordinate invariant, so all of the noninvariance must reside in
the extensive term. Thus, any measure complexity that is coordinate invariant
must discard the extensive component of the entropy.
If we continue along these lines, we can think about the asymptotic expansion
of the entropy at large T . The extensive term is the first term in this series, and
we have seen that it must be discarded. What about the other terms? In the
context of predicting in a parameterized model, most of the terms in this series
depend in detail on our prior distribution in parameter space, which might seem
odd for a measure of complexity. More generally, if we consider transformations
of the data stream x(t) that mix points within a temporal window of size τ , then
for T >> τ the entropy S(T ) may have subextensive terms which are constant,
and these are not invariant under this class of transformations. On the other
hand, if there are divergent subextensive terms, these are invariant under such
temporally local transformations. So if we insist that measures of complexity
be invariant not only under instantaneous coordinate transformations, but also
under temporally local transformations, then we can discard both the extensive
and the finite subextensive terms in the entropy, leaving only the divergent
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subextensive terms as a possible measure of complexity.
To illustrate the purpose of these two extra conditions, we may think of
measuring the velocity of a turbulent fluid flow at a given point. The condition of
invariance under reparameterizations means that the complexity is independent
of the scale used by the speedometer. On the other hand, the second condition
ensures that the temporal filtering due to the finite inertia of the speedometer’s
needle does not change the estimated complexity of the flow.
I believe that these arguments (or their slight variation also presented in
[83]) settle the question of the unique definition of complexity. Not only is
the divergent subextensive component of the entropy the unique complexity
measure, but it is also a universal one since it is connected in a straightforward
way to many other measures that have arisen in statistics and in dynamical
systems theory. In my mind the really big open question is whether we can
connect any of these theoretical developments to experiments on learning by
real animals (including humans).
I have emphasized the problem of learning probability distributions or prob-
abilistic models rather than learning deterministic functions, associations or
rules. In the previous section we have discussed examples where the nervous
system adapts to the statistics of its inputs; these experiments can be thought
of as a simple example of the system learning a parameterized distribution.
When making saccadic eye movements, human subjects alter their distribution
of reaction times in relation to the relative probabilities of different targets, as
if they had learned an estimate of the relevant likelihood ratios [93]. Humans
also can learn to discriminate almost optimally between random sequences (fair
coin tosses) and sequences that are correlated or anticorrelated according to a
Markov process; this learning can be accomplished from examples alone, with
no other feedback [94]. Acquisition of language may require learning the joint
distribution of successive phonemes, syllables, or words, and there is direct ev-
idence for learning of conditional probabilities from artificial sound sequences,
both by infants and by adults [95, 96].
Classical examples of learning in animals—such as eye blink conditioning
in rabbits—also may harbor evidence of learning probability distributions. The
usual experiment is to play a brief sound followed by a puff of air to the eyes, and
then the rabbit learns to blink its eye at the time when the air puff is expected.
But if the time between a sound and a puff of air to the eyes is chosen from
a probability distribution, then rabbits will perform graded movements of the
eyelid that seem to more or less trace the shape of the distribution, as if trying to
have the exposure of the eye matched to the (inverse) likelihood of the noxious
stimulus [97]. These examples, which are not exhaustive, indicate that the
nervous system can learn an appropriate probabilistic model, and this offers the
opportunity to analyze the dynamics of this learning using information theoretic
methods: What is the entropy of N successive reaction times following a switch
to a new set of relative probabilities in the saccade experiment? How much
information does a single reaction time provide about the relevant probabilities?
Using information theory to characterize learning is appealing because the
predictive information in the data itself (that is, in the data from which the
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subject is being asked to learn) sets a limit on the generalization power that the
subject has at his or her disposal. In this sense Ipred provides an absolute stan-
dard against which to measure learning performance in the same way that spike
train entropy provides a standard against which to measure the performance of
the neural code. I’m not really sure how to do this yet, but I can imagine that
an information theoretic analysis of learning would thus lead to a measurement
of learning efficiency [1] that parallels the measurement of coding efficiency or
even detection efficiency in photon counting. Given our classification of learning
tasks by their complexity, it would be natural to ask if the efficiency of learning
were a critical function of task complexity: perhaps we can even identify a limit
beyond which efficient learning fails, indicating a limit to the complexity of the
internal model used by the brain during a class of learning tasks.
6 A little bit about molecules
It would be irresponsible to spend this many hours (or pages) on the brain
without saying something that touches the explosion in our knowledge of what
happens at the molecular level. Electrical signals in neurons are carried by
ions, such as potassium or sodium, flowing through water or through special-
ized conducting pores. These pores, or channels, are large molecules (proteins)
embedded in the cell membrane, and can thus respond to the electric field or
voltage across the membrane. The coupled dynamics of channels and voltages
makes each neuron into a nonlinear circuit, and this seems to be the molecular
basis for neural computation. Many cells have the property that these nonlinear
dynamics select stereotyped pulses that can propagate from one cell to another;
these action potentials are the dominant form of long distance cell to cell com-
munication in the brain, and our understanding of how these pulses occur is
one the triumphs of the (now) classical ‘biophysics.’ Signals also can be carried
by small molecules, which trigger various chemical reactions when they arrive
at their targets. In particular, signal transmission across the synapse, or con-
nection between two neurons, involves such small molecule messengers called
neurotransmitters. Calcium ions can play both roles, moving in response to
voltage gradients and regulating a number of important biochemical reactions
in living cells, thereby coupling electrical and chemical events. Chemical events
can reach into the cell nucleus to regulate which protein molecules—which ion
channels and transmitter receptors—the cell produces. We will try to get a
feeling for this range of phenomena, starting on the back of an envelope and
building our way up to the facts.
Ions and small molecules diffuse freely through water, but cells are sur-
rounded by a membrane that functions as a barrier to diffusion. In particular,
these membranes are composed of lipids, which are nonpolar, and therefore can-
not screen the charge of an ion that tries to pass through the membrane. The
water, of course, is polar and does screen the charge, so pulling an ion out of the
water and pushing it through the membrane would require surmounting a large
electrostatic energy barrier. This barrier means that the membrane provides
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an enormous resistance to current flow between the inside and the outside of
the cell. If this were the whole story there would be no electrical signalling in
biology. In fact, cells construct specific pores or channels through which ions
can pass, and by regulating the state of these channels the cell can control the
flow of electric current across the membrane.
Ion channels are themselves molecules, but very large ones—they are proteins
composed of several thousand atoms in very complex arrangements. Let’s try,
however, to ask a simple question: If we open a pore in the cell membrane, how
quickly can ions pass through? More precisely, since the ions carry current and
will move in response to a voltage difference across the membrane, how large is
the current in response to a given voltage? We recall that the ratio of current
to voltage is called conductance, so we are really asking for the conductance of
an open channel. Again we only want an order of magnitude estimate, not a
detailed theory.
Imagine that one ion channel serves, in effect, as a hole in the membrane.
Let us pretend that ion flow through this hole is essentially the same as through
water. The electrical current that flows through the channel is
J = qion · [ionic flux] · [channel area], (106)
where qion is the charge of one ion, and we recall that ‘flux’ measures the current
across a unit area, so that
ionic flux =
ions
cm2s
=
ions
cm3
· cm
s
(107)
= [ionic concentration] · [velocity of one ion] (108)
= cv. (109)
Major current carriers like sodium and potassium are at c ∼ 100 milliMolar,
or c ∼ 6 × 1019 ions/cm3. The average velocity is related to the applied force
through the mobility µ, the force on an ion is in turn equal to the electric field
times the ionic charge, and the electric field is (roughly) the voltage difference
V across the membrane divided by the thickness ℓ of the membrane:
v = µqionE ∼ µqionV
ℓ
∼ D
kBT
qion
V
ℓ
, (110)
where in the last step we recall the Einstein relation between mobility and
diffusion constant. Putting the various factors together we find the current
J = qion · [ionic flux] · [channel area]
= qion · [cv] · [πd2/4] (111)
∼ π
4
qion · cd
2D
ℓ
· qionV
kBT
, (112)
where the channel has a diameter d. If we assume that the ion carries one
electronic charge, as does sodium, potassium, or chloride, then qion = 1.6×10−19
C and
qionV
kBT
=
V
25 mV
. (113)
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Typical values for the channel diameter should be comparable to the diameter
of a single ion, d ∼ 0.3 nm, and the thickness of the membrane is ℓ ∼ 5 nm.
Diffusion constants for ions in water are D ∼ 2×10−9m2/sec, or ∼ 2 (µm)2/sec,
which is a more natural unit. Plugging in the numbers,
J = gV (114)
g ∼ 2× 10−11 Amperes/Volt = 20 picoSiemens. (115)
So our order of magnitude argument leads us to predict that the conductance
of an open channel is roughly 20 pS, which is about right experimentally.
Empirically, cell membranes have resistances of Rm ∼ 103 ohm/cm2, or con-
ductances of Gm ∼ 10−3 S/cm2. If each open channel contributes roughly 10 pS,
then this membrane conductance corresponds to an average density of ∼ 108
open channels per cm2, or roughly one channel per square micron. This is
correct but misleading. First, they are many channels which are, at one time,
not open; indeed the dynamics with which channels open and close is very
important, as we shall see momentarily. Second, channels are not distributed
uniformly over the cell surface. At the synapse, or connection between two neu-
rons, the postsynaptic cell has channels that open in response to the binding
of the transmitter molecules released by the presynaptic cell. These ‘receptor
channels’ form a nearly close packed crystalline array in the small patch of cell
membrane that forms the closest contact with the presynaptic cell, and there
are other examples of great concentrations of channels in other regions of the
cell.
Problem 11: Membrane capacitance. From the facts given above, estimate the
capacitance of the cell membrane. You should get C ∼ 1µF/cm2.
Channels are protein molecules: heteropolymers of amino acids. As dis-
cussed by other lecturers here, there are twenty types of amino acid and a
protein can be anywhere from 50 to 1000 units in length. Channels tend to
be rather large, composed of several hundred amino acids; often there are sev-
eral subunits, each of this size. For physicists, the ‘protein folding problem’
is to understand what it is about real proteins that allows them to collapse
into a unique structure. This is, to some approximation, a question about the
equilibrium state of the molecule, since for many proteins we can ‘unfold’ the
molecule either by heating or by chemical treatment and then recover the origi-
nal structure by returning to the original condition.29 At present, this problem
is attracting considerable attention in the statistical mechanics community. For
a biologist, the protein folding problem is slightly different: granting that pro-
teins fold into unique structures, one would like to understand the mapping
from the linear sequence of amino acids in a particular protein into the three di-
mensional structure of the folded state. Again, this is a very active—but clearly
distinct—field of research.
We actually need a little more than a unique folded state for proteins. Most
proteins have a few rather similar structures which are stable, and the energy
29Of course there are interesting exceptions to this rule.
differences between these structures are several (up to ∼ 10) kBT , which means
that the molecule can be pushed from one state to another by interesting per-
turbations, such as the binding of a small molecule. For channels, there is a
more remarkable fact, namely that (for most channels) out of several accessible
states, only one is ‘open’ and conducting. The other states are closed or (and
this is different!) inactivated. If we think about arranging the different states
in a kinetic scheme, we might write
C1 ↔ C2 ↔ O, (116)
which corresponds to two closed states and one open state, with the constraint
that the molecule must pass through the second closed state in order to open.
If the open state also equilibrates with an ‘inactive’ state I that is connected to
C1,
C1 ↔ C2 ↔ O↔ I ↔ C1 , (117)
then depending on the rate constants for the different transitions the channel can
be forced to pass through the inactive state and then through all of the closed
states before opening again. This is interesting because the physical processes of
‘closing’ and ‘inactivating’ are often different, and this means that the transition
rates can differ by orders of magnitude: there are channels that can flicker open
and closed in a millisecond, but require minutes to recover from inactivation.
If we imagine that channels open in response to certain inputs to the cell, this
process of inactivation endows the cell with a memory of how many of these
inputs have occurred over the past minute—the states of individual molecules
are keeping count, and the cell can read this count because the molecular states
influence the dynamics of current flow across the membrane.
Individual amino acids have dipole moments, and this means that when the
protein makes a slight change in structure (say C2 → O) there will be a change
in the dipole moment of the protein unless there is an incredible coincidence.
But this has the important consequence that the energy differences among the
different states of the channel will be modulated by the electric field and hence
by the voltage across the cell membrane. If the difference in dipole moment
were equivalent to moving one elementary charge across the membrane, then we
could shift the equilibrium between the two states by changing the voltage over
∼ kBT/qe = 25mV, while if there are order ten charges transferred the channel
will switch from one state to another over just a few mV. While molecular
rearrangements within the channel protein do not correspond to charge transfer
across the whole thickness of the membrane, the order of magnitude change in
dipole moment is in this range.
It is important to understand that one can measure the current flowing
through single channels in a small patch of membrane, and hence one can ob-
serve the statistics of opening and closing transitions in a single molecule. From
such experiments one can build up kinetic models like that in Eq. (117), and
these provide an essentially exact description of the dynamics at the single
molecule level. The arrows in such kinetic schemes are to be interpreted not as
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macroscopic chemical reaction rates but rather as probabilities per unit time for
transitions among the states, and from long records of single channel dynamics
one can extract these probabilities and their voltage dependences. Again, this
is not easy, in part because one can distinguish only the open state—different
closed or inactivated states all have zero conductance and hence are indistin-
guishable when measuring current—so that multiple closed states have to be
inferred from the distribution of times between openings of the channel. This
is a very pretty subject, driven by the ability to do extremely quantitative ex-
periments; it is even possible to detect the shot noise as ions flow through the
open channel, as well as a small amount of excess noise due to the ‘breathing’
of the channel molecule while it is in the open state. The first single channel
experiments were by Neher and Sakmann [98], and a modern summary of what
we have learned is given in textbooks [99, 100].
Problem 12: Closed time distributions. For a channel with just two states, show
that the distribution of times between one closing of the channel and the next opening
is exponential in form. How is this distribution changed if there are two closed states?
Can you distinguish a second closed state (“before” opening) from an inactive state
(“after” opening)?
We would like to pass from a description of single channels to a description
of a macroscopic piece of membrane, perhaps even the whole cell. If we can
assume that the membrane is homogeneous and isopotential then there is one
voltage V across the whole membrane, and each channel has the same stochastic
dynamics. If the region we are talking about has enough channels, we can write
approximately deterministic equations for the number of channels in each state.
These equations have coefficients (the transition probabilities) that are voltage
dependent, and of course the voltage across the membrane has a dynamics driven
by the currents that pass through the open channels. Let’s illustrate this with
the simplest case.
Consider a neuron that has one type of ion channel that is sensitive to volt-
age, and a ‘leak’ conductance (some channels that we haven’t studied in detail,
and which don’t seem to open and close in the interesting range of voltages).
Let the channel have just two states, open and closed, and a conductance g
when it is open. Assume that the number of open channels n(t) relaxes to its
equilibrium value neq(V ) with a time constant τ(V ). In addition assume that
the gated channel is (perfectly) selective for ions that have a chemical potential
difference of Vion across the membrane, while the leak conductance Gleak pulls
the membrane potential back to its resting level Vrest. Finally, assume that the
cell has a capacitance C, and allow for the possibility of injecting a current Iext
across the membrane. Then the equations of motion for the coupled dynamics
of channels and voltage are
C
dV
dt
= −gn(V − Vion)−Gleak(V − Vrest) + Iext, (118)
dn
dt
= − 1
τ(V )
[n− neq(V )]. (119)
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These equations already have a lot in them:
• If we linearize around a steady state we find that the effect of the channels
can be thought of as adding some new elements to the effective circuit
describing the membrane. In particular these elements can include an
(effective) inductance and a negative resistance.
• Inductances of course make for resonances, which actually can be tuned
by cells to build arrays of channel–based electrical filters [101]. If the
negative resistance is large enough, however, the filter goes unstable and
one gets oscillations.
• One can also arrange the activation curve neq(V ) relative to Vion so that
the system is bistable, and the switch from one state to the other can be
triggered by a pulse of current. In an extended structure like the axon of
a neuron this switching would propagate as a front at some fixed velocity.
• In realistic models there is more than one kind of channel, and the non-
linear dynamics which selects a propagating front instead selects a prop-
agating pulse, which is the action potential or spike generated by that
neuron.
It is worth recalling the history of these ideas, at least briefly. In a series
of papers, Hodgkin and Huxley [102, 103, 104, 105] wrote down equations sim-
ilar to Eq’s. (118,119) as a phenomenological description of ionic current flow
across the cell membrane. They studied the squid giant axon, which is a single
nerve cell that is a small gift from nature, so large that one can insert a wire
along its length! This axon, like that in all neurons, exhibits propagating ac-
tion potentials, and the task which Hodgkin and Huxley set themselves was to
understand the mechanism of these spikes. It is important to remember that
action potentials provide the only mechanism for long distance communication
among specific neurons, and so the question of how action potentials arise is
really the question of how information gets from one place to another in the
brain. The first step taken by Hodgkin and Huxley was to separate space and
time: suspecting that current flow along the length of the axon involved only
passive conduction through the fluid, they ‘shorted’ this process by inserting a
wire and thus forcing the entire axon to become isopotential. By measuring the
dynamics of current flow between the wire and an electrode placed outside of
the cell they were then measuring the average properties of current flow across
a patch of membrane.
It was already known that the conductance of the cell membrane changes
during an action potential, and Hodgkin and Huxley studied this systematically
by holding the voltage across the membrane at one value and then stepping to
another. With dynamics of the form in Eq. (119), the fraction of open channels
will relax exponentially ... and after some effort one should be able to pull
out the equilibrium fraction of open channels and the relaxation rates, each as
functions of of voltage; again it is important to have the physical picture that
the channels in the membrane are changing state in response to voltage (or,
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more naturally, electric field) and hence the dynamics are simple if the voltage
is (piecewise) constant.
There are two glitches in this simple picture. First, the relaxation of conduc-
tance or current is not exponential. Hodgkin and Huxley interpreted this (again,
phenomenologically!) by saying that the equations for elementary ‘gates’ were
as in Eq. (119) but that conductance of ions trough a pore might require that
several independent gates are open. So instead of writing
C
dV
dt
= −gn(V − Vion)−Gleak(V − Vrest) + Iext, (120)
they wrote, for example,
C
dV
dt
= −gn4(V − Vion)−Gleak(V − Vrest) + Iext, (121)
which is saying that four gates need to open in order for the channel to conduct
(their model for the potassium channel). To model the inactivation of sodium
channels they used equations in which the number of open channels was pro-
portional to m3h, where m and h each obey equations like Eq. (119), but the
voltage dependences meq(V ) and heq(V ) have opposite behaviors—thus a step
change in voltage can lead to an increase in conductance as m relaxes toward its
increased equilibrium value, then a decrease as h starts to relax to its decreased
equilibrium value. In modern language we would say that the channel molecule
has more than two states, but the phenomenological picture of multiple gates
works quite well; it is interesting that Hodgkin and Huxley themselves were
careful not to take too seriously any particular molecular interpretation of their
equations. The second problem in the analysis is that there are several types of
channels, although this is easier in the squid axon because ‘several’ turns out to
be just two—one selective for sodium ions and one selective for potassium ions.
The great triumph of Hodgkin and Huxley was to show that, having de-
scribed the dynamics of current flow across a single patch of membrane, they
could predict the existence, structure, and speed of propagating action poten-
tials. This was a milestone, not least because it represents one of the few cases
where a fundamental advance in our understanding of biological systems was
marked by a successful quantitative prediction. Let me remind you that, in
1952, the idea that nonlinear partial differential equations like the HH equa-
tions would generate propagating stereotyped pulses was by no means obvious;
the numerical methods used by Hodgkin and Huxley were not so different from
what we might use today, while rigorous proofs came only much later.
Of course I have inverted the historical order in this presentation, describing
the properties of ion channels (albeit crudely) and then arguing that these can
be put together to construct the macroscopic dynamics of ionic currents. In fact
the path from Hodgkin and Huxley to the first observation of single channels
took nearly twenty five years. There were several important steps. First, the HH
model makes definite predictions about the magnitude of ionic currents flowing
during an action potential, and in particular the relative contributions of sodium
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and potassium; these predictions were confirmed by measuring the flux of ra-
dioactive ions.30 Second, as mentioned already, the transitions among different
channels states are voltage dependent only because these different states have
different dipole moments. This means that changes in channel state should be
accompanied by capacitive currents, called ‘gating currents,’ which persist even
if conduction of ions through the channel is blocked, and this is observed. The
next crucial step is that if we have a patch of membrane with a finite number of
channels, then it should be possible to observe fluctuations in current flow due
to the fluctuations in the number of open channels—the opening and closing
of each channel is an independent, thermally activated process. Kinetic mod-
els make unambiguous predictions about the spectrum of this noise, and again
these predictions were confirmed both qualitatively and quantitatively; noise
measurements also led to the first experimental estimates of the conductance
through a single open channel. Finally, observing the currents through single
channels required yet better amplifiers and improved contact between the elec-
trode and the membrane to insure that the channel currents are not swamped
by Johnson noise in stray conductance paths.
Problem 13: Independent opening and closing. The remark that channels open
and close independently is a bit glib. We know that different states have different
dipole moments, and you might expect that these dipoles would interact. Consider an
area A of membrane with N channels that each have two states. Let the two states
differ by an effective displacement of charge qgate across the membrane, and this charge
interacts with the voltage V across the membrane in the usual way. In addition, there
is an energy associated with the voltage itself, since the membrane has a capacitance.
If we represent the two states of each channel by an Ising spin σn, convince yourself
that the energy of the system can be written as
E =
1
2
CV 2 +
1
2
N∑
n=1
(ǫ+ qgateV )σn. (122)
Set up the equilibrium statistical mechanics of this system, and average over the
voltage fluctuations. Show that the resulting model is a mean field interaction among
the channels, and state the condition that this interaction be weak, so that the channels
will gate independently. Recall that both the capacitance and the number of channels
are proportional to the area. Is this condition met in real neurons? In what way does
this condition limit the ‘design’ of a cell? Specifically, remember that increasing qgate
makes the channels more sensitive to voltage changes, since they make their transitions
over a voltage range δV ∼ kBT/qgate; if you want to narrow this range, what do you
have to trade in order to make sure that the channels gate independently? And why,
by the way, is it desirable to have independent gating?
So, in terms of Hodgkin–Huxley style models we would describe a neuron by
30It also turns out that the different types of channels can be blocked, more or less indepen-
dently, by various molecules. Some of the most potent channel blockers are neurotoxins, such
as tetrodotoxin from puffer fish, which is a sodium channel blocker. These different toxins
allow a pharmacological ‘dissection’ of the molecular contributions to ionic current flow.
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equations of the form
C
dV
dt
= −
∑
i
Gim
µi
i h
νi
i (V − Vi)−Gleak(V − Vrest) + Iext, (123)
dmi
dt
= − 1
τ iact
[mi −mieq(V )], (124)
dhi
dt
= − 1
τ iinact
[hi − hieq(V )], (125)
where i indexes a class of channels specific for ions with an equilibrium potential
Vi and we have separate kinetics for activation and inactivation. Of course there
have been many studies of such systems of equations. What is crucial is that by
doing, for example, careful single channel experiments on patches of membrane
from the cell we want to study, we measure essentially every parameter of these
equations except for the total number of each kind of channel. This is a level of
detail that is not available in any other biological system as far as I know.
If we agree that the activation and inactivation variables run from zero to
unity, representing probabilities, then the number of channels is in the param-
eters Gi which are the conductances we would observe if all channels of class
i were to open. With good single channel measurements, these are the only
parameters we don’t know.
For many years it was a standard exercise to identify the types of chan-
nels in a cell, then try to use these Hodgkin–Huxley style dynamics to explain
what happens when you inject currents etc.. It probably is fair to say that
this program was successful beyond the wildest dreams of Hodgkin and Hux-
ley themselves—myriad different types of channel from many different types of
neuron have been described effectively by the same general sorts of equations.
On the other hand (although nobody ever said this) you have to hunt around
to find the right Gis to make everything work in any reasonably complex cell.
It was Larry Abbott, a physicist, who realized that if this is a problem for his
graduate student then it must also be a problem for the cell (which doesn’t
have graduate students to whom the task can be assigned). So, Abbott and his
colleagues realized that there must be regulatory mechanisms that control the
channel numbers in ways that stabilized desirable functions of the cell in the
whole neural circuit [106]. This has stimulated a beautiful series of experiments
by Turrigiano and collaborators, first in “simple” invertebrate neurons [107]
and then in cortical neurons [108], showing that indeed these different cells can
change the number of each different kind of channel in response to changes in
the environment, stabilizing particular patterns of activity or response. Mecha-
nisms are not yet clear. I believe that this is an early example of the robustness
problem [109, 110] that was emphasized by Barkai and Leibler for biochemical
networks [111]; they took adaptation in bacterial chemotaxis as an example (cf.
the lectures here by Duke) but the question clearly is more general. For more
on these models of self–organization of channel densities see [112, 113, 114].
The problem posed by Abbott and coworkers was, to some approximation,
about homeostasis: how does a cell hold on to its function in the network,
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keeping everything stable. In the models, the “correct” function is defined
implicitly. The fact that we have seen adaptation processes which serve to
optimize information transmission or coding efficiency makes it natural to ask if
we can make models for the dynamics which might carry out these optimization
tasks. There is relatively little work in this area [115], and I think that any effort
along these lines will have to come to grips with some tough problems about
how cells “know” they are doing the right thing (by any measure, information
theoretic or not).
Doing the right thing, as we have emphasized repeatedly, involves both the
right deterministic transformations and proper control of noise. We know a grat
deal about noise in ion channels, as discussed above, but I think the conventional
view has been that most neurons have lots of channels and so this source of
noise isn’t really crucial for neural function. In recent work Schneidman and
collaborators have shown that this dismissal of channel noise may have been a
bit too quick [116]: neurons operate in a regime where the number of channels
that participate in the “decision” to generate an action potential is vastly smaller
than the total number of channels, so that fluctuation effects are much more
important that expected naively. In particular, realistic amounts of channel
noise may serve to jitter the timing of spikes on time scales which are comparable
to the degree of reproducibility observed in the representation of sensory signals
(as discussed in Section 4). In this way the problems of molecular level noise
and the optimization of information transmission may be intertwined [109].
It should be emphasized that the molecular components we have been dis-
cussing are strikingly universal. Thus we can recognize homologous potassium
channels in primate cortex (the stuff we think with) and in the nerves of an
earthworm. There are vast numbers of channels coded in the genome, and these
can be organized into families of proteins that probably have common ances-
tors [99]. With such a complete molecular description of electrical signalling
in single cells, one would imagine that we could answer a deceptively simple
question: what do individual neurons compute? In neural network models, for
example, neurons are cartooned as summing their inputs and taking a thresh-
old. We could make this picture a bit more dynamical by using an ‘integrate
and fire’ model in which input currents are filtered by the RC time constant of
the cell membrane and all the effects of channels are summarized by saying that
when the resulting voltage reaches threshold there is a spike and a resetting to
a lower voltage. We would like to start with a more realistic model and show
how one can identify systematically some computational functions, but really
we don’t know how to do this. One attempt is discussed in Refs. [117, 118],
where we use the ideas of dimensionsality reduction [50, 59, 71] to pass from the
Hogdkin–Huxley model to a description of the neuron as projecting dynamic
input currents onto a low dimensional space and then performing some nonlin-
ear operations to determine the probablity of generating a spike. If a simple
summation and threshold picture (or a generalized ‘filter and fire’ model) were
correct, this approach would find it, but it seems that even with two types of
channels neurons can do something richer than this. Obviously this is just a
start, and understanding will require us to face the deeper question of how we
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can indentify the computational function of a general dynamical system.
In this discussion I have focused on the dynamics of ion channels within one
neuron. To build a brain we need to make connections or synapses between cells,
and of course these have their own dynamics and molecular mechanisms. There
are also problems of noise, not least because synapses are very small structures,
so that crucial biochemical events are happening in cubic micron volumes or
less. The emergence of optical techniques that allow us to look into these small
volumes, deep in the living brain, will quite literally bring into focus a number of
questions about noise in biochemical networks that are of interest both because
they relate to how we learn and remember things and because they are examples
of problems that all cells must face as they carry out essential functions.
7 Speculative thoughts about the hard problems
It is perhaps not so surprising that thinking like a physicist helps us to under-
stand how rod cells count single photons, or helps to elucidate the molecular
events that underlie the electrical activity of single cells. A little more surpris-
ing, perhaps, is that physical principles are still relevant when we go deeper
into a fly’s brain and ask about how that brain extracts interesting features
such as motion from a complex array of data in the retina, or how these dy-
namic signals are encoded in streams of action potentials. As we come to the
problems in learning, we have built an interesting theoretical structure with
clear roots in statistical physics, but we don’t yet know how to connect these
ideas with experiment. Behind this uncertainty is a deeper and more disturbing
question: maybe as we progress from sensory inputs toward the personal expe-
riences of that world created by our brains we will encounter a real boundary
where physics stops and biology or psychology begins. My hope, as you might
guess, is that this is not the case, and that we eventually will understand per-
ception, cognition and learning from the same principled mathematical point of
view that we now understand the inanimate parts of the physical world. This
optimism was shared, of course, by Helmholtz and others more than a century
ago. In this last lecture I want to collect some of my reasons for keeping faith
despite obvious problems.
In Shannon’s original work on information theory, he separated the prob-
lem of transmitting information from the problem of ascribing meaning to this
information [63]:
Frequently the messages have meaning; that is they refer to or are
correlated according to some system with certain physical or con-
ceptual entities. These semantic aspects of communication are irrel-
evant to the engineering problem.
This quote is from the second paragraph of a very long paper; italics appeared
in the original. Arguably this is the major stumbling block in the use of informa-
tion theory or any other “physical” approach to analyze cognitive phenomena:
our brains presumably are interested only in information that has meaning or
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relevance, and if we are in a framework that excludes such notions then we can’t
even get started.
Information theory is a statistical approach, and there is a widespread belief
that there must be “more than just statistics” to our understanding of the world.
The clearest formulation of this claim was by Chomsky [119], in a rather direct
critique of Shannon and his statistical approach to the description of English.
Shannon had used N th order Markov approximations to the distribution of
letters or words, and other people used this N–gram method in a variety of
ways, including the amusing “creative writing” exercises of Pierce and others.
Chomsky claims that all of this is hopeless, for several reasons:
1. The significance of words or phrases is unrelated to their frequency of
occurrence.
2. Utterances can be arbitrarily long, with arbitrarily long range dependences
among words, so that no finite N th order approximation is adequate.
3. A rank ordering of sentences by their probability in such models will have
grammatical and ungrammatical utterances mixed, with little if any ten-
dency for the grammatical sentences to be more probable.
There are several issues here,31 and while I am far from being an expert on
language I think if we try to dissect these issues we’ll get a feeling for the general
problems of thinking about the brain more broadly in information theoretic
terms.
First we have the distinction between the true probability distribution of
sentences (for example) and any finite N th order approximation. There are
plenty of cases in physics where analogous approximations fail, so this shouldn’t
bother us, nor is it a special feature of language. Nonetheless, it is important to
ask how we can go beyond these limited models. There is a theoretical question
of how to characterize statistics beyond N–grams, and there is an experimental
issue of how to measure these long range dependencies in real languages or, more
subtly, in people’s knowledge of languages. I think that we know a big part of
the answer to the first question, as explained above: The crucial measure of long
range correlation is a divergence in the predictive information Ipred(N), that is
the information that a sequence of N characters or words provides about the
remainder of the text. We can distinguish logarithmic divergence, which means
roughly that the sequence of words allows us to learn a model with a finite
number of parameters (the coefficient of the log then counts the dimensionality
of the parameter space), from a power law divergence, which is what happens
when longer and longer sequences allow us to learn a more and more detailed
31Some time after writing an early draft of these ideas I learned that Abney [120] had
expressed similar thoughts about the nature of the Chomsky/Shannon debate; he is concerned
primarily with the first of the issues below. I enjoyed especially his introduction to the problem:
“In one’s introductory linguistics course, one learns that Chomsky disabused the field once
and for all of the notion that there was anything of interest to statistical models of language.
But one usually comes away a little fuzzy on the question of what, precisely, he proved.”
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description of the underlying model. There are hints that language is in the
more complex power law class.
A second question concerns the learnability of the relevant distributions. It
might be that the true distribution of words and phrases contains everything
we want to know about the language, but that we cannot learn this distribution
from examples. Here it is important that “we” could be a child learning a
language, or a group of scientists trying to analyze a body of data on language
as it is used. Although learnability is a crucial issue, I think that there is some
confusion in the literature. Thus, even in very recent work, we find comments
that confuse the frequency of occurrence of examples that we have seen with
the estimate that an observer might make of the underlying distribution.32 The
easiest way to see this is to think about distributions of continuous variables,
where obviously we have to interpolate or smooth so that our best estimate of
the probability is not zero at unsampled points nor is it singular at the sampled
points. There are many ways of doing this, and I think that developments of
the ideas in Ref. [90] are leading us toward a view of this problem which at
least seems principled and natural from a physicist’s point of view [123, 124,
125, 126, 127]. On the other hand, the question of how one does such smoothing
or regularization in the case of discrete distributions (as for words and phrases)
is much less clear (see, for example, [128]).
Even if we can access the full probability distribution of utterances (leaving
aside the issue of learning this distribution from examples), there is a question of
whether this distribution captures the full structure of the language. At one level
this is trivial: if we really have the full distribution we can generate samples,
and there will be no statistical test that will distinguish these samples from real
texts. Note again that probability distributions are “generative” in the sense
that Chomsky described grammar, and hence that no reasonable description
of the probability distribution is limited to generating sequences which were
observed in some previous finite sampling or learning period. Thus, if we had an
accurate model of the probability distribution for texts, we could pass some sort
of Turing test. The harder question is whether this description of the language
would contain any notions of syntax or semantics. Ultimately we want to ask
about meaning: is it possible for a probabilistic model to encode the meanings
of words and sentences, or must these be supplied from the outside? Again
the same question arises in other domains: in what sense does knowing the
distribution of all possible natural movies correspond to “understanding” what
32In particular, a widely discussed paper by Marcus et al. [121] makes the clear statement
that all unseen combinations of words must be assigned probability zero in a statistical learning
scheme, and this simply is wrong. The commentary on this paper by Pinker [122] has some
related confusions about what happens when one learns a distribution from examples. He
notes that we can be told “that a whale is not a fish ... overriding our statistical experience
...” . In the same way that reasonable learning algorithms have to deal with unobserved
combinations, they also have to deal with outliers in distributions; the existence of outliers, or
the evident difficulty in dealing with them, has nothing to do with the question of whether our
categories of fish and mammals are built using a probabilistic approach. The specific example
of whales may be a red herring: does being told that a whale is not a fish mean that “all the
fish in the sea” cannot refer to whales?
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we are seeing?
Recently, Tishby, Pereira and I have worked on the problem of defining
and extracting relevant information, trying to fill the gap left by Shannon [85].
Briefly, the idea is that we observe some signal x ∈ X but are interested in
another signal y ∈ Y . Typically a full description of x requires many more bits
than are relevant to the determination of y, and we would like to separate the
relevant bits from the irrelevant ones. Formally we can do this by asking for a
compression of x into some new space X˜ such that we keep as much information
as possible about Y while throwing away as much as possible about X . That
is, we want to find a mapping x → x˜ that maximizes the information about Y
while holding the information about X fixed at some small value. This problem
turns out to be equivalent to a set of self–consistent equations for the mapping
x→ x˜, and is very much like a problem of clustering. It is important that, unlike
most clustering procedures, there is no need to specify a notion of similarity or
distance among points in the X or Y spaces—all notions of similarity emerge
directly from the joint statistics of X and Y .
To see a little of how this works, let’s start with a somewhat fanciful ques-
tion: What is the information content of the morning newspaper? Since entropy
provides the only measure of information that is consistent with certain simple
and plausible constraints (as emphasized above), it is tempting to suggest that
the information content of a news article is related to the entropy of the dis-
tribution from which newspaper texts are drawn. This is troublesome—more
random texts have higher entropy and hence would be more informative—and
also incorrect. Unlike entropy, information always is about something. We can
ask how much an article tells us about, for example, current events in France,
or about the political bias of the editors, and in a foreign country we might even
use the newspaper to measure our own comprehension of the language. In each
case, our question of interest has a distribution of possible answers, and (on
average) this distribution shifts to one with a lower entropy once we read the
news; this decrease in entropy is the information that we gain by reading. This
relevant information typically is much smaller than the entropy of the original
signal: information about the identity of a person is much smaller than the
entropy of images that include faces, information about words is much smaller
than the entropy of the corresponding speech sounds, and so on. Our intuitive
notion of ‘understanding’ these high entropy input signals corresponds to iso-
lating the relevant information in some reasonably compact form: summarizing
the news article, replacing the image with a name, enumerating the words that
have been spoken.
When we sit down to read, we have in mind some question(s) that we expect
to have answered by the newspaper text. We can enumerate all of the possible
answers to these questions, and label the answers by y ∈ Y : this is the relevant
variable, the information of value to us. On the other hand, we can also imagine
the ensemble of all possible newspaper texts, and label each possible text by
x ∈ X : these are the raw data that we have to work with. Again, there are many
more bits in the text x than are relevant to the answers y, and understanding
the text means that we must separate these relevant bits from the majority of
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irrelevant bits. In practice this means that we can ‘summarize’ the text, and
in the same way that we enumerate all possible texts we can also enumerate all
possible summaries, and labelling them by x˜ ∈ X˜. If we can generate good or
efficient summaries then we can construct a mapping of the raw data x into the
summaries x˜ such that we discard most of the information about the text but
preserve as much information as possible about the relevant variable y.
The statement that we want our summaries to be compact or efficient means
that we want to discard as much information as possible about the original sig-
nal. Thus, we want to ‘squeeze’ or minimize the information that the summary
provides about the raw data, I(x˜;x). On the other hand, if the summary is
going to capture our understanding, then it must preserve information about
y, so we want to maximize I(x˜; y). More precisely, there is going to be some
tradeoff between the level of detail [I(x˜;x)] that we are willing to tolerate and
the amount of relevant information [Ix˜; y)] that we can preserve. The optimal
procedure would be to find rules for generating summaries which provide the
maximum amount of relevant information given their level of detail. The way
to do this is to maximize the weighted difference between the two information
measures,
−F = I(x˜; y)− TI(x˜;x), (126)
where T is a dimensionless parameter that measures the amount of extra detail
we are willing to accept for a given increase in relevant information. We will
refer to this parameter as the temperature, for reasons that become clear below.
So, to find optimal summaries we want to search all possible rules for mapping
x → x˜ until we find a maximum of −F , or equivalently a minimum of the
‘free energy’ F . Note that the structure of the optimal procedure generating
summaries will evolve as we change the temperature T ; there is no ‘correct’
value of the temperature, since different values correspond to different ways of
striking a balance between detail and effectiveness in the summaries.
There are several different interpretations of the principle that we should
minimize F . One view is that we are optimizing the weighted difference of the
two informations, counting one as a benefit and one as a cost. Alternatively, we
can see minimizing F as maximizing the relevant information while holding fixed
the level of detail in the summary, and in this case we interpret T as a Lagrange
multiplier that implements the constraint holding I(x˜;x) fixed. Similarly, we can
divide through by T and interpret our problem as one of squeezing the summary
as much as possible—minimizing I(x˜;x)—while holding fixed the amount of
relevant information that the summaries convey; in this case 1/T serves as the
Lagrange multiplier.
It turns out that the problem of minimizing the free energy F can solved, at
least formally. To begin we need to say what we mean by searching all possible
rules for mapping x→ x˜. We consider here only the case where the summaries
forma discrete set, and for simplicity we (usually) assume that the data x and
the relevant variable y also are drawn from discrete sets of possibilities. The
general mapping from x to x˜ is probabilistic, and the set of mapping rules is
given completely if we specify the set of probabilities P (x˜|x) that any raw data
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point x will be assigned to the summary x˜. These probabilities of course must
be normalized, so we must enforce∑
x˜∈X˜
P (x˜|x) = 1 (127)
for each x ∈ X . We can do this by introducing a Lagrange multiplier Λ(x) for
each x and then solving the constrained optimization problem
min
P (x˜|x)

F −∑
x∈X
Λ(x)
∑
x˜∈X˜
P (x˜|x)

 , (128)
and at the end we have choose the values of Λ(X) to satisfy the normalization
condition in Eq. (127).
As shown in Ref. [85], the Euler–Lagrange equations for this variational
problem are equivalent to a set of self–consistent equations for the probability
distribution P (x˜|x):
P (x˜|x) = P (x˜)
Z(x, T )
exp
{
− 1
T
∑
y∈Y
P (y|x) ln
[
P (y|x)
P (y|x˜)
]}
(129)
P (y|x˜) =
∑
x∈X
P (y|x)P (x|x˜)
=
1
P (x˜)
∑
x∈X
P (y|x)P (x˜|x)P (x). (130)
Up to this point, the set of summaries X˜ is completely abstract. If we
choose a fixed number of possible summaries then the evolution with temper-
ature is continuous, and as we lower the temperature the summaries become
progressively more detailed [I(x˜;x) is increasing] and more informative [I(x˜; y)
is increasing]; the local coefficient that relates the extra relevant information
per increment of detail is the temperature itself.
If X is discrete, then the detail in the summary can never exceed the entropy
S(X), and of course the relevant information provided by the summaries can
never exceed the relevant information in the original signal. This means that
there is a natural set of normalized coordinates in the information plane I(x˜; y)
vs. I(x˜;x), and different signals are characterized by different trajectories in
these normalized coordinates. If signals are ‘understandable’ in the colloquial
sense, it must be that most of the available relevant information can be captured
by summaries that are very compact, so that I(x˜; y)/I(x; y) is near unity even
when I(x˜;x)/S(X) is very small. At the opposite extreme are signals that have
been encrypted (or texts which are so convoluted) so that no small piece of the
original data contains any significant fraction of the relevant information.
Throughout most of the information plane the optimal solution has a prob-
abilistic structure—the assignment rules P (x˜|x) are not deterministic. This
means that our problem of providing informative but compact summaries is
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very different from the usual problems in classification or recognition, where if
we ask for assignment rules that minimize errors we will always find that the
optimal solution is deterministic (recall Problem 2). Thus the information theo-
retic approach encompasses automatically a measure of confidence in which the
optimal strategy involves (generically) a bit of true random guessing when faced
with uncertainty. Returning to our example of the newspaper, this has an im-
portant consequence. If asked to provide a summary of the front page news, the
optimal summaries have probabilistic assignments to the text—if asked several
times, even an ‘optimal reader’ will have a finite probability of giving different
answers each time she is asked. The fact that assignment rules are probabilistic
means also that these rules can be perturbed quantitatively by finite amounts
of additional data, so that small amounts of additional information about, for
example, the a priori likelihood of different interesting events in the world can
influence the optimal rules for summarizing the text. It is attractive that a
purely objective procedure, which provides an optimal extraction of relevant
information, generates these elements of randomness and subjectivity.
Extracting relevant information has bene called the “information bottleneck”
because we squeeze the signal X through a narrow channel X˜ while trying to
preserve information about Y . This approach has been used, at least in pre-
liminary form, in several cases of possible interest for the analysis of language.
First, we can take X to be one word and Y to be the next word. If we insist
that there be very few categories for X˜—we squeeze through a very narrow
bottleneck—then to a good approximation the mapping from X into X˜ consti-
tutes a clustering of words into sensible syntactic categories (parts of speech,
with a clear separation of proper nouns). It is interesting that in the cognitive
science literature there is also a discussion of how one might acquire syntactic
categories from such “distributional information” (see, for example, [129]), al-
though this discussion seems to use somewhat arbitrary metrics on the space of
conditional distributions.
If we allow for X˜ to capture more bits about X in the next word problem,
then we start to see the general part of speech clusters break into groups that
have some semantic relatedness, as noted also by Redington et al. [129]. A
more direct demonstration was given by Pereira, Tishby and Lee [130], who
took X and Y to be the noun and verb of each sentence.33 Now one has the
clear impression that the clusters of words (either nouns or verbs) have simi-
lar meanings, although this certainly is only a subjective remark at this point.
Notice, however, that in this formulation the absolute frequency of occurrence
of individual words or even word pairs is not essential (connecting to Chom-
sky’s point #1 above); instead the clustering of words with apparently similar
meanings arises from the total structure of the set of conditional distributions
33This was done before the development of the bottleneck ideas so we need to be a bit
careful. Tishby et al. proposed clustering X according the conditional distributions P (y|x)
and suggested the use of the Kullback–Leibler divergence (DKL) as a natural measure of
distance. In the bottleneck approach there is no need to postulate a distance measure, but
what emerges from the analysis is essentially the soft clustering based on DKL as suggested
by Tishby et al..
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P (y|x).
Yet another possible approach to “meaning” involves takingX as the identity
of a document Y as a word in the document. Slonim and Tishby [131] did this
for documents posted to twenty different news groups on the web, of course
hiding any information that directly identifies the news group in the document.
The result is that choosing roughly twenty different values for X˜ captures most
of the mutual information between X and Y , and these twenty clusters have
a very strong overlap with the actual newsgroups. This procedure—which is
‘unsupervised’ since the clustering algorithm does not have access to labels on
the documents—yields a categorization that is competitive with state of the art
methods for supervised learning of the newsgroup identities. While one may
object that some of these tasks are too easy, these results at least go in the
direction of suggesting that analysis of word statistics alone can identify the
“topic” of a document as it was assigned by the author.
I think that some reasonably concrete questions emerge from all of this:
• How clear is the evidence that language—or other (colloquially) complex
natural signals—fall into the power-law class defined through the analysis
of predictive information?
• On a purely theoretical matter, can we regularize the problem of learning
distributions over discrete variables in a (principled) way which puts such
learning problems in the power–law class?
• Can we use the information bottleneck ideas to find the features of words
and phrases that efficiently represent the large amounts of predictive in-
formation that we find in texts?
• Can we test, in psycholinguistic experiments, the hypothesis that this
clustering of words and phrases through the bottleneck collects together
items with similar meaning?
• If we believe that meanings are related to statistical structure, can we shift
our perceptions of meaning by exposure to texts with different statistics?
This last experiment would, I think, be quite compelling (or at least provoca-
tive). When we set out to test the idea that neural codes are “designed” to
optimize information transmission, the clear qualitative prediction was that the
code would have to change in response to the statistics of sensory inputs, and
this would have to work in ways beyond the standard forms of adaptation that
had been characterized previously. This prediction was confirmed, and it would
be quite dramatic if we could design a parallel experiment on our perception of
meaning. Surely this is the place to stop.
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The text and reference list make clear the enormous debt I owe to my colleagues
and collaborators. I especially want to thank Rob de Ruyter, since it is literally
because of his experiments that I had the courage to “think about the brain” in the
sense which I tried to capture in these lectures. The adventure which Rob and I have
had in thinking about fly brains in particular has been one we enjoyed sharing with
many great students, postdocs and collaborators over the years: A. Zee, F. Rieke,
D. K. Warland, M. Potters, G. D. Lewen, S. P. Strong, R. Koberle, N. Brenner, E.
Schneidman, and A. L. Fairhall (in roughly historical order). While all of this work
blended theory and experiment to the point that there are few papers which are ‘purely’
one or the other, I’ve also been interested in some questions which, as noted, have yet
to make contact with data. These ideas also have developed in a very collaborative
way with C. G. Callan, I. Nemenman, F. Pereira, and N. Tishby (alphabetically).
Particularly for the more theoretical topics, discussions with my current collaborators
J. Miller and S. Still have been crucial. I am grateful to the students at Les Houches
for making the task of lecturing so pleasurable, and to the organizers both for creating
this opportunity and for being so patient with me as I struggled to complete these
notes. My thanks also to S. Still for reading through a (very) late draft and providing
many helpful suggestions.
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